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The current study proposed a multifactorial model of threat assessment activity
(MFTA) in order to assess the effectiveness of threat management interventions for
preventing problematic physical approach and violence in institutes of higher education
(Scalora & Bulling, 2007; Scalora, Zimmerman, & Wells, 2008; Scalora, Plank, &
Scheoneman, 2009). In order to answer this overarching goal, the current study analyzed a
sample of 332 cases reported to a Police Department of a Midwestern University between
2006 and 2016. The MFTA model was statistically tested via a structural equation model.
Overall, the results of this study suggested that the MFTA model provided a valid approach
to examine the different stages of the threat assessment and management processes.
Specifically, the main findings of this model showed threat activity involved a wide pool of
individuals who contacted directly and repeatedly several targets and institutions for
personal reasons. Factors such as unresolved interpersonal conflicts and severe mental
disorder further exacerbated the risk for physically approaching the target. For this reason,
most of the threat assessment cases required management strategies that contained the
individuals’ behavior and aimed to hinder any additional direct face-to-face contact with
the target. The results of the structural equation model suggested these strategies effectively
assisted in decreasing problematic behavior over time and preventing violence at a longterm. Implications for future threat management practices were discussed.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
I. Scope of Threat Assessment
1. Definition of Targeted Violence
Practitioners often deal with the task of assessing whether an individual is likely to
behave violently in the future (e.g., over the next year, over the next five years, or over the next
10 years). Most of these predictions refer to a type of violence that is impulsive or situationdriven. In these acts of violence, there is no “premeditation.” For example, an individual could
act violently as a result of a spontaneous fight at a bar or could be involved in an unexpected
shooting exchange during a drug dealing activity, etc. Less often, practitioners are faced with the
challenge of assessing the risk of violence when a particular individual targets or plans to attack
an identifiable person, group of persons, or an institution (see Fein & Vossekuil, 1998; Fein,
Vossekuil, & Holden, 1995). This type of premeditated violence is called “targeted violence.”
Targeted violence has been often described as planned or predatory because violent
action does not appear in a vacuum (e.g., people just do not “snap” and decide to attack a target)
(see Meloy, 2006). Targeted violence is a “grievance-based dynamic” (Calhoun & Weston,
2003; Scalora, 2002a) that is the culmination of “long-developing, identifiable trails of problems,
conflicts, disputes, and failures” between the subject and the target (Fein et al., 1995, p. 3).
These conflicts often manifest in problematic behavioral activity (e.g., intrusive
communications), which is enhanced by situational and contextual factors. If the conflicts with
the target further intensify, a subject might start conceiving violence as the only possible solution
to his or her problems. Once the subject is committed to a violent action, he or she displays overt
“attack-related” behaviors such as acquiring weapons, leaking their violent intentions/plans to
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others, and/or attempting to gain access to the target (Meloy, Hoffmann, Gildinmann, & James,
2012; Scalora et al., 2002a; Vossekuil, Reddy, Fein, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2000).
2. Examples of Targeted Violent Related Activity
Most acts of targeted violence tend to encompass threats, stalking activity, sexual assault,
or physical attacks. However, not all such activity falls within the scope of targeted violence.
Stalking comprises of behavioral patterns where a person is targeted, persecuted, and/or
subjected to unwanted verbal or electronic communications or approach, and from which the
victim feels distress (Coleman, 1997; Cupach & Spitzberg, 1998; Douglas, Burgess, Burgess, &
Ressler, 2006; Meloy, 1998; Melton, 2000, 2007; Mullen, Pathé, & Purcell, 2000). This activity
affects approximately 3.3 million people age 18 or older over the course of a year (Catalano,
2012). At present, there are no official statistics of the proportion of stalking or threat cases that
could be classified as targeted violent acts. However, scientific literature suggests that public
officials as well as individuals in educational and workplace settings are particularly vulnerable
to targeted violent acts related to stalking (Adams, Hazelwood, Pitre, Bedard, & Landry, 2009;
Calhoun & Weston, 2006; Every-Palmer, Barry-Walsh, & Pathé, 2015; Galeazzi & De Fazio,
2006; Hoffmann, Meloy, & Sheridan, 2014; Kelloway, Barling, & Hurrell, 2006; Lowry, Pathé,
Phillips, Haworth, Mulder, & Briggs, 2015; Malsch, Visscher, & Blaauw, 2002; Pathé, Phillips,
Perdacher, & Heffernan, 2014; Spitzberg, 2016; Storey, 2016).
Physical violence is defined as the actual or attempted physical harm to a person or
persons by hitting, pushing, strangling, or harming with the use of a weapon (see Douglas, Hart,
Webster, & Belfrage, 2013). Physical violence is the culmination or the end goal of some of the
targeted violent trajectories. If the subject succeeds carrying out a physical attack, this activity
might terminate with another human being’s life (i.e., homicide) or multiple lives (i.e., multiple-
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victim homicide) (Holmes & Holmes, 1992). Terrorist activities and mass shootings are common
examples of targeted physical violence. Terrorist activity is defined as the unlawful use of force
or violence committed by a group or individual that could be led by a foreign or home-based
power that has the goal of intimidating or coercing a government or civilian population in
furtherance of political objectives (Department of Homeland Security, 2005). Terrorist attacks
and mass shootings have gained increasing attention due to a rise in the number of these events
over the last 30 years (Cornell, 2010; Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010; Federal Bureau of
Investigation, FBI, 2013; Fein et al., 2002; Miller, 2014; National Violent Death Reporting
system, 2013; Spaaij, 2010).
Targeted violent activity could occasionally escalate into sexual violence. Sexual
violence is defined as unwanted sexual activity carried through force, threat of force, or
incapacitation of the victim (American College Health Assessment, ACHA, 2004; Carr, 2005;
Wilson & Miller, 2016). While not all sexual assaults are the end result of targeted violence
activity, there are particular events that appeared strongly related to targeted violent acts
especially when they are the continuation of stalking activity (see Fisher, Cullen, & Turner,
2000).
3. Threat Assessment and Educational Institutions
Threat assessment is the term used to describe the set of investigative techniques and
management strategies that can be used to identify, assess, and intervene with individuals at risk
of engaging in acts of targeted violence (Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, & Berglund, 1999; Fein et al.,
1995; Vossekuil, Fein, & Berglund, 2015). Most of these management strategies aim to intervene
when the subjects are in the initial stages of planning an attack or even when they display
problematic behavior without a definitive attack plan. Interventions in these early stages are
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preferable to, and more effective than, interventions that reactively neutralize subjects in the final
stages of an attack plan (e.g., subjects heavily armed that are on their way to attack a venue)
(Borum et al., 1999).
Threat assessment in educational settings has been applied in colleges or universities as
well as K-12 settings (Fein et al., 2002; Mayer & Leone, 1999; Scalora, Simons, & Vanslyke,
2010). Educational settings might be vulnerable not only to the threats posed by students and
workers affiliated with the educational institution but also to the threats posed by outsiders, such
as partners, ex-partners, parents, or friends that intrude in these settings. Therefore, there could
be some overlap between the threats that the community experiences and the current threat challe
nges on college campuses. For this reason, a superficial glance to college-age individuals’
victimization rates might provide some preliminary information of the extent and need for threat
assessment services as a way of ensuring their safety.
In the community, college-age individuals are the most vulnerable age group for violent
victimization (1% community and 20% individuals between 18 and 24 years old) (Lauritsen &
Reizey, 2013). Most of these individuals are attending college at that time (Fisher & Wilkes,
2003), and often report being victims of behaviors related to stalking activity (14%-27%)
(Spitzberg, 2016) and threats (20%) (Lauritsen & Reizey, 2013), which could escalate into
physical violence (36%) (Roberts, 2005) and sexual assault (10.3%) (Fisher et al., 2000).
II. Threat Assessment: Conceptual Model and Risk Factors
1. Conceptual Model: Pathway Towards Violence (Calhoun & Weston, 2003)
Calhoun and Weston (2003) developed a model to assist in preemptively identifying
those individuals in their “pathway towards (target) violence” (see Figure 1). Conceptually, this
model shows different opportunities for intervention and prevention of targeted violence.
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Calhoun and Weston’s (2003) model described a series of “stages” that individuals
typically follow in their “pathway” towards a violent action. According to this model, individuals
with a particular grievance towards the target start contemplating violence as the only potential
solution to their problems. As the individuals become committed to the violent action, they show
behaviors that are consistent with this commitment. For example, they might engage in attack
preparatory activity, such as doing research on the target or practicing with weapons. Once a
plan is developed, the individual starts trying to breach security around the target. Once the
individual reaches this stage, the possibility of an attack is imminent.
Interestingly, Calhoun and Weston’s 2003 pathway towards violence model implicitly
measures the risk of physical proximity. This model follows prior research findings suggesting
that most of the instances of targeted violence occurred during face-to-face interaction or close
physical proximity (Borum et al., 1999; Fein et al., 1995; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999). Therefore,
most of the stages of the pathway towards violence implicitly suggest that gaining physical
proximity with the target increases the risk for targeted violence. For example, trying to breach
security measures in order to approach the target is considered a sign of an imminent attack. For
this reason, most of the literature in threat assessment considers trying to gain physical proximity
in an aggressive or intimidating manner with the target as a proxy for violence. Physical
proximity or problematic physical approach is the outcome measure of most of the research in
targeted violence (see Meloy, 2014).
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Figure 1
Pathway towards violence by Calhoun and Weston (2003)

While the pathway towards violence model is conceptually simple, its practical
application is complex. Calhoun and Weston (2003) do not suggest that individuals necessarily
need to go through all the stages before physically approaching or attempting an attack.
However, some practitioners might mistakenly assume that a “linear” form of behavioral
escalation towards violence is the most common trajectory towards an attack. As demonstrated
below, current data shows that this assumption is equivocal. For example, a study of problematic
approach towards British royalty showed that individuals who attempted an attack did not follow
the set predetermined behavioral paths (see James et al., 2010a). Other factors such as specific
subject’s characteristics, target factors, and behaviors might precipitate approach and violence
without the desired escalation. Research literature now offers a more detailed approach of the
factors that influence a targeted violent action. Most of these factors intertwine with each other in
a complex manner that cannot be reflected in Calhoun and Weston’s model. A review of these
factors is shown below.
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2. Risk Factors Related to Individuals of Concern, Targets, and Pre-incident Behaviors
2.1. Subjects’ characteristics
The literature indicates that there is no profile of individuals that engage in targeted
violence acts such as stalking violence (Cornell, 2010; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999), mass homicide
(Burns, Dean, & Jacob-Timm, 2001; O’Toole, 2000), or any form of terrorist activity (e.g.,
recruitment, organizing attacks, or carrying an attack) (Borum, Fein, & Vossekuil, 2012; Gill,
2015; Horgan, 2008; Monahan, 2012). These individuals are identified as potential perpetrators
of an attack due to their behavior, including acquiring weaponry, verbalizing violent ideation,
researching the target, etc. (see Fein & Vossekuil, 1998). However, literature points out specific
characteristics that might influence subject behavior. As detailed below, most subjects of concern
are affiliated to the settings towards which they pose a threat (e.g., students, faculty,
staff/workers, etc.). Further, most subjects do not have a violent criminal record and do not make
attempts to disguise their identity either. However, literature fluctuates with respect to the
presence of symptoms of major mental illness. A description of these characteristics is offered
below.
2.1.1. Affiliated vs. Non-affiliated to the institution under protection. One of the most
important individuals’ factors for threat assessment is whether the individual is affiliated with the
institution towards which he or she poses a threat (e.g., educational setting, workplace
environment, or government agency). In educational settings, students affiliated to the institution
perpetrated most of the stalking activity or partner violence (e.g., boyfriend, classmate, or
workmate) (McGuire & Wraith, 2000). Similarly, the majority of the mass murder attacks
against educational settings appeared to be carried with individuals connected to the educational
institution (O’Toole, 2000; Reddy et al., 2001).
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In contrast, workplace environments appeared more vulnerable to outsider threats. Harrell
(2011) indicated that individuals with no direct connection to the work company perpetrated
79% of the attacks against work settings (e.g., robbers). Outsiders further displayed some
differences when compared to workers that posed a threat to their workplace. For example,
Scalora, Washington, Casady, and Newell (2003b) found that outsiders had a prior criminal
history and threatened the target prior to an approach (e.g., customer-related conflict in which
threats are uttered). In contrast, current or former workers harassed individuals with whom they
had a relationship, which suggest the workplace could have been chosen because of its easy
access or predictable schedules (i.e., the targets arrives or leaves work at specific time from
specific exits).
2.1.2. Prior violence and problematic relationships with others. Most individuals at
risk for targeted violence had prior contacts with the law (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; Scalora et al.,
2002a), which could be related to prior problematic contact with the target and subsequent threat
activity (Baumgartner, 2004; Scalora, Baumgartner, & Plank, 2003; Schoeneman, Scalora,
Darrow, McLawsen, Chang, & Zimmerman, 2011). However, these individuals’ prior criminal
record is rarely violent (Scalora et al., 2002b). In addition to potential problems with the law,
individuals at risk of targeted violence often have conflictive relationships with others. These
individuals are often described as “problematic,” “irritable,” “not very sociable,” or even
“loners” (Bondü, Cornell, & Scheithauer, 2011; Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; Hayes, Crane, &
Locke, 2010; Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, & Gray, 2001).
2.1.3. Mental illness and substance use. Individuals who commit acts of targeted
violence have often suffered from symptoms of major mental illness, including delusions,
hallucinations, or thought disorder (Scalora et al., 2003). Positive symptoms of psychosis
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appeared to be present in a substantial number of cases of harassment and problematic approach
towards public figures (42%-83%) (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; Hoffman et al., 2011; James et al.,
2007; James et al., 2008; James et al., 2009; Marquez & Scalora, 2011; Scalora et al., 2002a;
Scalora et al., 2002b; Scalora et al., 2003a; Coggins, Steadman, & Veysey, 1996), cases of
students who are at risk of lethal violence (Bondü et al., 2011; Cranford, Eisenberg, & Serras,
2009; Kessler et al., 2005), and cases of lone wolf terrorists (Corner & Gill, 2015).
Symptoms of major mental illness are hypothesized to fuel individuals’ grievance as well
as violent ideation (Bondü et al., 2011). Hayes, Crane, and Locke (2010) found that 3% out of
27,616 Midwestern students had strong fears of acting out violently towards others on the
college campus and that these individuals were often involved in mental health services. These
students’ violent ideation appeared associated with conflicts with others, irritability, hopelessness
about the future, and increased suicidal ideation. When individuals became desperate, they often
fixated on a person who was perceived as responsible for their problems and expressed violent
ideation (e.g., posts on the Internet, verbalizations to others, etc.) (Cohen, Johansson, Kaati, &
Mork, 2014). People close to these subjects might become aware of their violent intentions, but a
study found they often failed to report this behavior in a timely manner (Gill et al., 2014).
Additional opportunity for early detection for these potentially violent individuals might
appear as a result of their involvement in mental health services. Most of the individuals who
presented violent ideation were also likely to endorse suicidal ideation (4%-6% college students
rate of suicidal ideation) (Drum, Brownson, Burton Denmark, & Smith, 2009) and symptoms of
depression for which they were referred to mental health services (Harwood, 2011; McCauley,
Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013). These symptoms further appeared related to negative life
changes, perception of victimization, and chronic stress (Corner & Gill, 2015).
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Last, use of substances appears to be a relevant factor for violence (Douglass, et al.,
2013). In younger populations, alcohol and drug use is often linked to sexual violence (Calzada,
Brown, & Doyle, 2011). However, individuals who committed an act of targeted violence were
rarely intoxicated during the attacks (Meloy et al., 2001).
2.1.4. Identifying oneself. Most of the individuals who target another person, group, or
institution do not attempt to disguise their identities (Dietz & Martell, 2010; Scalora et al.,
2002a; Scalora et al., 2002b). However, these individuals might conceal their identities on the
Internet or during the last stages of pre-attack planning (Calhoun, 1998; McCauley et al., 2013).
It is possible that this behavior aims at avoiding early detection and intervention.
2.1.5. The process of radicalization and attitudes favorable for violence. Recent
literature in threat assessment is applying the models used to prevent attacks against elected
officials to the prevention of individuals’ involvement in terrorism. This application to the study
of terrorism was motivated by prior research findings. First, Gill (2015) found the prediction of
the low-base rate phenomena, such as terrorism, might not be possible from a mathematical point
of view. Second, Monahan (2012) indicated past literature has failed to provide appropriate
predictors for terrorism involvement (“the why”) (e.g., fail to find personality traits of a terrorist,
see Horgan, 2008). Monahan posited that part of the difficulty in answering this question stems
from the wide array of terrorist organizations and the different levels of terrorist involvement.
Third, another study found marked differences among individuals who became involved in a
terrorist organization depending on their role on such organization (“who”) (e.g., leadership,
recruiter, or tactical person) (see Canter, Sarangi, & Youngs, 2014). Given the heterogeneity of
involved in terrorist activity, recent studies have changed the focus of inquiry.
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Current assessment of terrorism involvement does not aim at understanding who would
become radicalized and why (i.e., a predictive approach). Instead, researchers examine the
behaviors that are indicative of radicalization and of the risk for engaging in a violent act
(Horgan, 2008).
A first layer of research studies focuses on understanding the characteristics of people
who sympathize with a terrorist cause. While there are no official base rates, a study showed
2.4% of a British community sample of Muslim individuals sympathized with violent political
action (aged 18 to 45) (Bhui, Warfa, & Jones, 2014). In this study, individuals who condoned
terroristic violence were English speakers under 20 who came from affluent families and were
enrolled in full-time education. Research further indicated that not all of the individuals who
sympathized with a terrorist cause became radicalized, and has further showed sympathizers and
radicalized individuals did not present different demographics (see Gartenstein-Ross, 2014).
Therefore, identification of subjects at risk of radicalization cannot depend on profiling subjects.
At present, there is little agreement in which factors are indicative of radicalization (i.e.,
the process by which a subject becomes involved and stays involved with terroristic ideas and/or
action) (Borum, 2014). Gill (2015) noted that there are +100 predictors of radicalization, yet
little is known about any of them (e.g., base rates or cohort effects). Despite this lack of detailed
information, literature converges that radicalization is a multifactor process that results from the
combination of cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and interpersonal factors. In line with this
hypothesis, Soliman, Bellaj, and Khelifa (2016) tested a structural equation model of
vulnerability to radicalization and found that good fitting models incorporated measures of social
environment (e.g., need to belong), cognitive correlates (e.g., tolerance to frustration, decision
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making style, cognitive style scale, etc.), and psychopathology (e.g., escalate to measure
personality disorders).
In addition to its multifactorial nature, research points that radicalization is not a
homogeneous process. Individuals might become radicalized through multiple mechanisms at
individual and group levels (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008), which often include change in
family and/or peer interactions, change in religious and/or political practices, and increased
contact with other individuals involved in terroristic activity (e.g., speaking with other
radicalized individuals, contacting recruiters, combat training, etc.) (Egan et al., 2016). In this
process, as individuals progress through the “ladder of radicalization,” they appear to display
more overt violent behavior. However, not all individuals that become radicalized engage in
violence or vice versa (Khalil, 2014). In order to determine which individuals will progress
towards violence, practitioners rely on specific behavioral dynamics that serve to identify
individuals at higher risk (Meloy & Gill, 2016).
Individuals who are at higher risk to carry out a terrorist attack are those individuals that
have a grievance, motivation, intent, and capability to do so (Lemieux & Regens, 2012). Recent
studies indicated that these factors make terrorist individuals similar to other targeted violent
offenders. For example, similar to the study of Fein and his colleagues (2002), Gill, Horgan, &
Deckert (2014) noted that there is no uniform profile of a lone wolf. People generally detect
these individuals based on their expressed grievances or attack preparatory behaviors (grievances
were known by third parties in 83% of the cases and attack plans were known in 58% of the
cases). Capellan (2015) explained that symptoms of mental illness might intensify the perception
of the grievance and encourage the individuals to act violently, which would manifest in the
individuals’ written and verbal communications. In line with these findings, Cohen, Johansson,
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Kaati, and Mork (2014) found that online information conveyed by problematic individuals
might be used to assess leakage of violent ideation, fixation on a cause, and identification with a
violent group of individuals.
2.2. Target factors
People or institutions that are targeted by potentially violent individuals are diverse. Most
of the time, the target and the perpetrator’s prior problematic interaction contributed to escalate
the risk for targeted violence (see Fein & Vossekuil, 1998). Less often, targets are chosen by
their convenience or iconic meaning, which contributes to broader media coverage. In any of
these cases, target characteristics influence violent escalation and potential case management.
2.2.1. Socio-demographics and relationship with the subject of concern. There are not
official victimization rates for targeted violent activity. Most of the targeted violent events
appeared to be embedded in the statistics of general criminal acts such as stalking, harassment,
and physical violence. However, which percentage of the victimization rates of these criminal
activities is related to impulsive types of violence and which percentage is related to targeted
violence acts is still unknown. Despite this difficulty, general victimization rates would be
provided as a proxy of individual victimization rates of targeted violent activity.
Studies with large community samples indicate that females are victimized more often
than males (Próspero & Vohra-Gupta, 2008) and that they suffer multiple forms of victimization
(Wilcox, Jordan, & Pritchard, 2007). Within the community, college students appear particularly
affected by events that could be part of targeted violence activity. Specifically, college women
presented higher victimization rates related to partner violence, stalking, and sexual violence
than college men (20%-44% females vs. 12%-16% males), while college men presented higher
victimization rates related to physically assault than college women (18% males vs. 11%
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females) (Fox, Nobles, & Piquero, 2009). Faculty and other staff in educational settings are also
victims of harassment dynamics in educational settings. Approximately 33% of faculty has been
harassed at some point in their careers, with female faculty stalked by male students being the
majority of these victims (Morgan & Kavanaugh, 2011). Most of the faculty (67.8%) reported
being followed or pursued against their will, but only a minority of these cases (6%-11%) met
the legal criteria for stalking (Winkleman & Windstead, 2011).
Workplace victimization appears to be more predominant in the public sector. Individuals
working in law enforcement and security seemed to be more vulnerable to violence, followed by
professionals from health care professions (Harrell, 2013). In the private sector, 28% of the
victims of workplace homicide were involved in sales and related occupations and about 17%
were involved in protective service occupations (Harrell, 2011).
Public officials are also vulnerable to harassment and violence. Most individuals who
fixated on public officials have not met them before. However, many of these individuals
believed that they had an important relationship with the elected officials that confers them the
right to pursue these officials (Dietz et al., 1991; James et al., 2011).
2.2.2. Target dispersion. Target dispersion has rarely been analyzed in college violence,
workplace violence, or terrorism even though anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals of
concern might have shared their grievance with multiple people before acting violently (Meloy,
2014; Reddy et al., 2001; Scalora et al., 2002a; Scalora et al., 2003b). This activity should be
distinguished from the act of targeting multiple individuals.
Literature focusing on public figures has often analyzed the impact of target dispersion in
subsequent problematic approach. A third of the individuals who approached public officials
engaged in target dispersion or targeted multiple individuals (i.e., multiple primary targets)
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(Baumgartner, 2004; Calhoun, 2001; James et al., 2010; Marquez & Scalora, 2011; Scalora et al.
2002a, 2002b; Schoeneman-Morris, Scalora, Chang, Zimmerman, & Garner, 2007). Target
dispersion might occur when individuals contact a third party complaining about the target (see
Scalora et al., 2002b). For example, an individual might harass an elected official and complain
about this person to his or her office staff. The office staff might become targets as well.
In contrast, individuals that harass multiple targets might do so because they have
particular reasons for harassing each of their targets. All of these figures should be considered
primary targets. Cases that include multiple elected officials that can range from state
government elected officials (Baumgartner, Scalora, & Plank, 2001) to high profile public
figures, such as members of congress (Dietz et al., 1991), the President of the United States (Fein
& Vossekuil, 1999), or even members of the monarchy in other countries (James et al., 2007;
James et al., 2009; James et al., 2010).
2.2.3. Institutions as target. Though many assailants usually have some sort of
connection with the targeted institution, the probability of an attack increases depending on the
level of threat, the vulnerability, and the potential damage/consequences of such an attack
(Willis, Morral, Kelly, & Medby, 2005). In the cases of individuals without direct affiliation to
the institution, familiarity with the target still plays an important role. For example, a study of 84
attacks in the U.S. between 1940 and 2012 suggested that the individuals chose their targets
based on their familiarity with them (Becker, 2014). Familiarity with a particular target might
occur because the target is physically available to the individual or because the institution is
iconic and known to the individual (e.g., Boston bombings, see Spaaij & Hamm, 2015).
Temporal proximity of important social events might also trigger an attack to a specific
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institution. For example, Newman (2013) found that terrorist attacks against the community and
institutions increase close to presidential elections.
2.3. Communication of Grievances
Calhoun and Weston (2003) indicated that understanding the grievance towards the target
is a key factor in the assessment of a potential threat. Grievances are often communicated to the
target or other third parties over the course of problematic activity. Obviously, there is not
complete certainty that these individuals have completely reported the extent of their grievance
(O’Toole, 2000). Therefore, researchers often note that they analyzed the reported grievance or
communication themes as proxies for motivations for targeted violence (Scalora et al., 2002b).
2.3.1. Communication themes. Once individuals become committed to a particular
cause and start engaging in problematic activity, they often feel compelled to reveal the many
reasons for their actions (Calhoun, 1998). O’Toole (2000) suggests that, in addition to the
content of the communication theme, practitioners should also attend to the emotional content of
the grievance, including the statements that indicate anger, sense of entitlement, lack of empathy,
externalization of blame, or experience of personal stressors. This author further noted that
practitioners might also benefit by attending to information indicative of protective factors, such
as resiliency or respect towards authority.
Regarding educational environments, subjects often communicated grievances related to
revenge and anger themes (Drysdale et al., 2010). These individuals also showed overt signs of
mental illness in their communications that can be romantic or hostile in nature (Morgan &
Kavanaugh, 2011). Sense of failure and misfit were further components of the grievance in cases
of students that target their educational institutions or their faculty (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy,
Borum, & Modzeleski, 2002). Faculty acts of targeted violence have received limited attention,

17
but case studies suggest that paranoid ideation and potential failure for promotion might be
triggers for a violent act (see case of Amy Bishop, see Blair & Schweit, 2014).
Individuals who target their workplace settings mostly resemble the case of faculty that
take violent action against their educational institutions. In most cases, workplace attacks are
conducted by disgruntled employees that felt mistreated by their employer and peers (see Type 3
and Type 4 workplace violent events, Rugala, 2001).
Grievances against public officials often involve multiple themes. Individuals expressed a
desire for notoriety, revenge, or political change as well as intent to debase the target (Fein &
Vossekuil, 1999). Research performed by Scalora and colleagues (2002) analyzed whether
specific motives or communication themes were associated with approach behavior (and
potential violence). These authors found that approachers displayed more personalized themes in
their communications. These themes were characterized for help-seeking statements, reports that
the individuals’ life were at risk, or remarks indicating these individuals felt attacked by the
target (Baumgartner, 2004; Hoffman et al., 2011; Scalora et al., 2003; Schoeneman et al., 2011).
Borum (2014) explained that grievances related to terrorist activity are multidimensional.
Individuals involved in terrorist activity mostly expressed attitudes favorable to violence and
rigid dogmatic thinking indicating that violence is the only solution. Grievances related to
terrorism are often sustained by claims of attacks against the terrorist identity (e.g., attacks
against Muslims) or status (e.g., immigrants will invade a country). The individuals often convey
that failure to attack and beat the enemy will result in material loss (e.g., loss of their country or
culture). These messages are commonly accompanied by a desire for thrills (e.g., enjoyment of
violent action), revenge (e.g., enemy deserve the violent action), and moral obligation (e.g., it is
your duty as a Muslim to attack any objective).
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2.3.2. The importance of personalizing grievances. Personalizing a grievance entails
making such grievances central to the individuals’ life and identity (Borum, 2015; Scalora et al.,
2002a). Personal grievances tend to be very specific, which could be assessed by the elaborated
content in the communications with the target and other third parties. Schoeneman-Morris,
Scalora, Chang, Zimmerman, and Garner (2007) analyzed the content of problematic letters and
emails sent to a national sample of public officials and found that individuals who personalized
their grievances expressed that their life was at risk (as a result of the targets’ action or lack
thereof), their personal rights were violated, they needed help from the target, or they suffered
multiple stressors. These individuals could display delusional ideations in their communications
that further indicated a personalized grievance. For example, they could believe that the target
was a malevolent force that could hurt them or they could believe that they have a special
relationship with the target, which entitled them to continue contacting this target.
Most of the individuals who harass a target tended to desist after an episode in which they
expressed their discontent (James et al., 2010b; Scalora et al., 2002a). For example, students
might express discontent to faculty in a rather aggressive manner once and desist after
appropriate feedback; or a constituent might intercept a senator and become belligerent once
before being notified by law enforcement that such behavior is unacceptable and legally
punishable. However, individuals who personalized their grievances tended to persist in their
contact behavior (Marquez & Scalora, 2011) or continued to stay involved in any activity that
furthered their violent attitudes or ideation (e.g., terrorist activity) (Borum, 2015). Individuals
who personalized a grievance were also more likely to escalate their behavior into approach and
violence (Baumgartner et al., 2001; Scalora et al., 2002a; Scalora et al., 2003a; Meloy et al.,
2011; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999).
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2.2. Problematic contact behavior.
Most acts of targeted violence or physical approach are often preceded by problematic
contact behavior (also called behaviors of concern) (see Scalora et al., 2002). This type of
activity usually informs the professionals about the level of concern, which is the risk of a person
committing an act of targeted violence based on the information available at the moment. Level
of concern is linked to the notion of imminence, which is the estimated timeframe for the violent
action to occur (see Meloy et al., 2012).
The assessment of the level of concern and imminence of violence depends on the nature
of the behavioral activity. Subjects of concern that engage in proximity behaviors are likely to be
considered high concern and at risk for imminent violence (i.e., try to gain physical proximity
with the target and/or practice with weapons before approaching the target). Behaviors that do
not aim at gaining physical access to the target might not be indicative of high levels of concern
by themselves (e.g., unwanted and intrusive communications). However, the interrelations of
several of these non-proximity behaviors might suggest increased levels of concern. The next
section describes the behaviors that are analyzed as part of threat behavioral activity.
2.2.1. Proximity behaviors. These behaviors of concerns are often considered proxies for
violent behavior. In most of the threat assessment literature, this behavioral activity is the
dependent variable (Borum et al., 1999; James et al., 2010b; James & Farnham, 2003; McEwan,
McKenzie, Mullen, & James, 2012; Scalora et al., 2002a; Scalora et al., 2002b).
2.2.1.1. Face-to-face contact. Threat assessment literature indicates that most of the
individuals who attacked and even killed a target did so in close physical proximity (Borum et
al., 1999; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; Meloy, 2014). Attacks might occur when problematic
contacts progress towards physically approaching the target. Once the individuals are face-to-
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face, approach could escalate into physical violence (Calhoun, 1998; Hoffman et al., 2011;
Unsgaard & Meloy, 2011; Van der Meer, 2015). Hoffmann, Meloy, Guldimann, and Ermer
(2011) found that 46% of the individuals in their sample attempted to physically approach before
trying to attack. However, only 12% of these individuals were able to establish direct contact
with victim beforehand (i.e., face-to-face contact).
Therefore, a central issue of targets’ protection is to prevent physical approach. Key
indicators for physical approach are the individuals’ statement suggesting a desire to approach
the target as well as the possibility to re-approach if the subject has attempted to gain physical
access in the past (between 34%-56% celebrity and elected officials were approached a second
time) (Dietz & Martell, 2010).
2.2.1.2. Weapon access and practice in connection with homicidality. Prior to gaining
access to the target, subjects of concern typically plotted against specific individuals and
prepared an attack (Drysdale et al., 2010). High level of concern is especially warranted when
these individuals showed the capability of carrying out the planned attack (see Lloyd & Dean,
2015). Indicators of capability are commonly assessed by the individuals’ access, skill, and
experience using weapons.
Most of these attacks are preceded by the subjects’ attempts to obtain and practice with
weapons (especially firearms) (Bondü et al., 2011; Harrell, 2011; Meloy et al., 2011; Meloy et
al., 2014; Scalora et al., 2003b). This behavior is considered especially severe when it occurs in
connection with homicidal ideation and prior interpersonal conflict (Bondü et al., 2011). This
pattern has been consistently found in different samples of school shooters (Meloy et al., 2001;
Meloy, Hempel, Gray, Mohandie, Shiva, & Richards, 2004; Meloy et al., 2014), family mass
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murderers (Viñas-Racionero, Schlesinger, Scalora, & Jarvis, 2016), and terrorists (see TRAP-18,
Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy & Yakeley, 2014).
2.2.2. Non-proximity behavior. Unwanted verbal and written communications, as well as
surveillance behavior, by themselves might alert threat assessment professionals that a subject
poses a threat towards a particular target. This behavioral activity might increase the level of
concern when presented in combination with homicidal ideation, weapon access, and a desire to
physically approach the target. However, when it is presented in isolation, it is often indicative of
lower levels of concern.
2.2.2.1. Written and verbal threats. Threats are defined as expressions of the intention to
harm (Bondü & Scheithauer, 2014). O’Toole (2000) noted that threats could be direct (i.e., “I am
going to kill you”), conditional (i.e., “If you do not do what I say, I will kill you”), or veiled (i.e.,
“Something bad might happen to you”).
Any type of threat should be taken seriously. Despite that, many threat assessment
professionals suggest the most dangerous individuals are those who pose a threat rather than
those who simply utter a threat (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). According to the threat assessment
literature, individuals who approached or attacked a target rarely threatened this target in
advance (see Meloy, 2014). On limited occasions, individuals might approach and potentially
attack after uttering a threatening statement (21%-42%) (Scalora et al., 2002a).
Despite these findings, threats are a common concern in the community, educational
institutions, and mental health settings (Cornell et al., 2004; Fisher & Wilkes, 2003; HatchMaillette, Scalora, Bader, & Bornstein, 2007; McNamara & Marsil, 2012). In these settings, the
risk of threats increases when the individual has or had an intimate relationship with the target. If
intimidating verbalizations fail to overpower a partner, physical aggression could be used to
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regain control (Sinclair & Frieze, 2005; McEwan et al., 2012; Warren, Mullen, & Ogloff, 2011).
This differs markedly from findings from prior studies on public figure attacks (see Fein &
Vossekuil, 1999). Threats have been predictive of future violent action in cases of intimate
partner stalking (i.e., intimacy effect) (Calhoun & Weston, 2003).
2.2.2.2. Non-threatening unwanted written and verbal communications. The most
common examples of unwanted and intrusive communications are unwanted telephone calls,
unwanted letters, unwanted text messages, and unwanted e-mails (Fisher et al., 2000; Fisher,
2001; Schoeneman et al., 2007; Schoeneman et al., 2011; Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002). These
behaviors are often combined with surveillance and intrusive activities (McNamara & Marsil,
2012), which means that most threatening activity is multi-modal (Cavezza & McEwan, 2014).
2.2.2.3. Surveillance behavior. Several studies have alerted about the pervasiveness of
surveillance activities. For example, the results of the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) indicate that almost half of the community samples have witnessed the following
behaviors from the subject of concern: waiting outside or inside locations; watching from afar; or
following (Amar, 2007; Fisher et al., 2000; Fisher, 2001; McNamara & Marsil, 2012). Given the
difficulty of detecting this behavior, it is hypothesized that the rates found in prior studies are
just an underestimation of the real prevalence. Similarly, there are few explanations on how this
behavior might increase the risk for violence, even though monitoring and doing research on a
target have been listed as behaviors that preceded an attack (see Meloy et al., 2001).
In addition to traditional forms of surveillance, new technologies offer the possibility of
spying on a victim through the use of computers. Individuals of concern could steal private
information, hack into the target’s email, and spy on the target through the social networks
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(McNamara & Marsil, 2012). On other occasions, these individuals implant malware on the
target’s computer (Fortinet, 2013).
2.2.2.4. Leakage to non-targeted third parties. Leakage are those statements, pictures, or
drawings that are communicated to individuals other than the target, regarding the subject’s
willingness to engage in violent action (Bondü & Scheithauer, 2014; Meloy & O’Toole, 2011).
Meloy, Hoffmann, Roshdi, and Guldinmann (2014) noted that leakage was a common behavior
among youth that were hypothesized to be at risk for targeted violence. However, leakage lacked
discriminatory value, as both individuals who engaged and did not engage in violence leaked
homicidal ideation to others. For this reason, while this behavior is important to consider, it
might not be an accurate predictor of violent behavior by itself.
Posts on Facebook might be another potential form of leakage of violent intention.
Lyndon, Bonds-Raacke, and Cratty (2011) found that online posts were mostly used for three
different goals: covert provocation, public defamation, or venting. In the case of terrorist activity,
Post (2015) found that the new wave of terrorists become radicalized through the Internet, where
they express violent intention and learn different attack strategies without contacting another
individual directly (Weinmann, 2011; Wright, 2008).
III. An Integrative Model of Threat Assessment Activity
1. Problems of Current Approach to the Study of Targeted Violence
At present, there seems to be a gap between the pathway towards violence model and the
findings of research studies. It is hypothesized that the difference between theory and practice
might be due to the different methodological approaches.
Threat assessment literature conceptualized targeted violence from a process-driven
approach, which attempts to describe individuals’ cognitive and behavioral processes during the
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planning of a violent action. However, researchers have often analyzed this process from a dataoriented approach, discriminating individuals who have committed acts of targeted violence (or
approached the target) from a control group of individuals who have not engaged in such violent
behaviors (i.e., post-hoc analyses). The main limitation of these studies is that observable data is
only collected after the problematic behavior has occurred. These studies did not capture how
dynamic factors influence individuals as they progressed along the pathway towards violence,
which is the main point of the conceptual model. Therefore, conceptual and empirical models
might not have a direct correspondence. This methodological gap has also been highlighted in
other areas of research on targeted violence (see Cohen, 2016).
Such a lack of correspondence is understandable from a naturalistic point of view, since it
is not possible to predict which individuals might escalate their behavior into violence (and
obviously monitor these individuals’ behavioral progression over time). However, both the
conceptual and the statistical approaches have benefits. The conceptual model guides
practitioners’ understanding that individual’s characteristics and pre-attack behaviors influenced
the final outcome, even if it is only an indirect effect. Case studies are often guided by the
conceptual model of targeted violence. In contrast, data-driven approaches are filled with
associations among different individuals’ characteristics and specific behaviors of concerns, such
as physical approach. This approach enriches the conceptual model pointing out which factors to
consider.
A solution that blends both approaches might improve the way researchers study targeted
violent dynamics. Models with repeated measures might be an option to bring the best of the
conceptual models and the data-driven models. Ideally, an individual of concern will be reported
to authorities, who would start monitoring the individuals of concern at different points in time.
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Any escalation in frequency or severity of behavior (e.g., attempts to interact with the target
face-to-face) might be assessed and recorded. This process of analyzing data might be closer to
the conceptual process-driven approach of targeted violence with some limitations. Once an
incident has been reported to authorities, threat assessment professionals that deal with
individuals at risk for targeted violence would immediately intervene to de-escalate the risk and
prevent any potential attack. Therefore, no perfect correspondence can be drawn between
individuals successfully managed and individuals who were not detected and eventually acted
violently (i.e., individuals who have not been part of a threat management process). Despite this
limitation, this model might improve past attempts to reconcile theory and practice.
However, there are specific elements of this conceptual model that needed to be sorted in
order to translate into research terms. Scalora developed a model in 2007 that incorporated all
these concepts and bolstered then with sound factors driven from past studies in targeted violent
dynamics (Scalora & Bulling, 2007).
2. An Integrative Multifactorial Model of threat Assessment Activity
Scalora integrated Calhoun and Weston’s 2003 pathway towards violence model and
prior research findings into a multifactorial model of threat assessment activity (MFTA) (Scalora
& Bulling, 2007; Scalora, Zimmerman, & Wells, 2008; Scalora, Plan, & Scheoneman, 2009).
The MFTA model has been tested in a study of problematic approach towards public figures and
has yielded significant results (Viñas-Racionero, Freese, & Scalora, 2016b). In this study, the
dependent/outcome variable was physical contact with the target, as it is considered a proxy for
violence (see Meloy, 2014).
As shown in Figure 2, some factors precede others in the MFTA model (i.e., repeated
measures mediation model). The subject and target factors exist prior to the display of any
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problematic behavior. Once specific individual(s) have identified specific target(s), their
likelihood to attack a target increased when they showed increased problematic behavioral
activity. This also considers the mediation effects of the individuals’ grievance, which might
escalate individuals’ behavior towards an attack in absence of multiple behavioral signs directed
towards the target.
Figure 2
Multifactorial model of threat assessment activity (MFTA)
Subject factors

Target factors
Motivational
factors

Contact behavior

Approach
behavior

Protective
resources
Contextual
factors

This model has several advantages over prior conceptualization attempts. This model
integrates prior findings using a more flexible approach that analyzes changes in dynamic risk
factors. Furthermore, once individuals display any form of negative contact, the MFTA model
posits that this behavior does not escalate in a “linear fashion” (e.g., from behavior A to behavior
B to approach). Similarly, this model does not exclusively rely on gaining physical proximity
when determining which individual is at higher risk for violence. This model considers different
areas in order to identify the individuals at risk for targeted violence. Specifically, this model
examines different trajectories of factors that are indicative of intensity of effort. These
advantages are described in the next sections.
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2.1. Flexible approach: Dynamic nature of individuals’ risk factors. The MFTA
model is a repeated measures design that allows capturing change over time. Capturing change
over time is extremely important in the case of dynamic factors. Most of the recent studies
analyzing pre-attack behaviors incorporate the presence of dynamic factors and the changes of
these factors over time (Douglas et al., 2013; Meloy et al., 2012; Meloy & Gill, 2016; White &
Meloy, 2010). The novelty of the MFTA model is not just the consideration of dynamic factors
but the notion that these factors have indirect effects on other variables when mediated by a third
variable.
Variations of the MFTA mediation model could be used to test the fluctuations of
dynamic factors over time (e.g., crossed lag models). Factors such as mental illness or substance
use can fluctuate over time. Individuals’ symptoms might worsen or, in contrast, individuals
might get treatment and improve. Similarly, changes in the thematic content over time might
inform whether individuals who become more “fixated” on the target display changes in the
content of their grievance (e.g., increase in violent ideation over time).
2.2. Non-linear escalation patterns. The concept of escalation has been defined as a
linear transition from intrusive communications towards physical approach, but literature shows
that this process of escalation is not necessary for an approach/violence to occur (McEwan et al.,
2012). Therefore, preliminary information indicates that problematic behavior associated to
targeted violence could evolve in a non-linear fashion (James et al., 2010a; McEwan et al.,
2012).
The MFTA model might give additional information about the non-linear association
between specific indicators and physical approach or violence. Behavior might wax and wane
over time and these fluctuations are not indicative of a lesser risk. There are several explanations
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why a behavior might momentarily fade away and the re-appear with higher intensity. One
simple explanation is the external contingencies to the individual’s behavior (e.g., mental health
intervention, arrest, academic affairs instruction, etc.). Another explanation is that behavior
might not need to be overt preparation of an assault in order to indicate increased risk for
violence. For example, individuals displaying suicidal ideation might be as high risk as others
who display violent ideation.
While difficult to assess, models testing quadratic associations among variables might
help clarify this point. For example, a variation of the MFTA model using latent growth models
might help to assess whether behaviors escalate in severity following a linear type of fashion or
whether risk increases at certain intensity of specific behavior (e.g., inverted U-shaped type of
association).
2.3. Assessment of intensity of effort. Intensity of effort is a broad construct that
involves an increase in problematic behavioral activity directed towards the target or other
individuals (Meloy, 2011; Scalora, 2014). Literature shows that individuals’ intensity of effort is
one of the major predictors of physical approach and attack (Scalora et al., 2002a; Meloy et al.,
2011). Most studies conceptualized intensity of effort as heavily overlapping with repeated
attempts to contact a target using different communication means (e.g., letters, emails, calls,
texts, etc.) (see Hoffman et al., 2011; James et al., 2007; Meloy et al., 2011). However, intensity
of effort also involves increased frequency of contacts, increased duration of contacts over time,
and target dispersion (Scalora, 2014). In addition, intensity of effort is often enhanced by
subjects’ mental illness and the presence of personalized grievances. Factors describing intensity
of effort and intensity of effort enhancers are described below.
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2.3.1. Perseverance. Perseverance has been described as the frequency of a particular
behavior or activity (Viñas-Racionero, Freese, & Scalora, 2016b). There is limited research
analyzing the influence of perseverance behavior. Viñas-Racionero, Freese, and Scalora (2016b)
analyzed the influence of perseverance on physical violence via path analysis. These authors
found that perseverance was not linearly related to physical violence, while persistence and
variety of intrusive behaviors were significantly related to violence. These authors hypothesized
that perseverance might have significant quadratic correlation with violence, which is consistent
with Dietz and Martell’s (2010) study. Dietz and Martell pointed out that perseverance has an
inverted U-shaped relationship with physical approach. These authors found that the risk for
problematic approach increased with each successive communication until the 10th, and
decreased thereafter.
The MFTA model does not currently incorporate direct indicators of perseverance.
However, this indicator could be used as a moderator in the final model. Further research is
needed to conclude the role of these factors in a mediation model.
2.3.2. Persistence. Persistence is described as the duration of the problematic behavior
over time (James et al., 2010b). At present, scientific studies support that persistence and variety
of behavior modalities are good predictors for approach (see James et al., 2010b; Meloy, 2014).
This factor has been found to be a robust indicator of violence in a complex structure equation
model that also tested the unique contributions of perseverance and multiple contact modalities
(Viñas-Racionero et al., 2016b).
2.3.3. Multiple contact modalities. Multiple contact modalities involve behaviors that
aim at contacting the target through electronic and non-electronic means. Face-to-face
interactions are part of this activity as well. However, given the link between face-to-face contact
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and violence, this behavior has been often treated as the dependent variable (outcome) in
research studies rather than as part of multiple contact modalities.
Usually, multiple contact modalities involve contacting through several means. For
example, individuals of concern might telephone in addition to writing and also express a desire
for face-to-face contact (Dietz & Martell, 2010). In harassers of public figures, multiple contact
modalities, mental illness, and intrusive intimacy-seeking communications usually co-occur
(James et al., 2010b). These characteristics are associated to violence (McEwan et al., 2012) and
future recidivism (Eke, Hilton, Meloy, Mohandie, & Williams, 2011). Individuals who engaged
in multiple contact modalities were more likely to approach the target (Dietz & Martell, 2010;
Marquez & Scalora, 2011; Scalora et al., 2002a). In addition, it was the strongest factor
predicting violence when tested in combination with perseverance and persistence (ViñasRacionero et al., 2016b).
2.3.4. Target dispersion or a diffused target (multiple potential victims). One of the
most important components of intensity of effort is the presence of target dispersion, which has
been associated with physical approach (Meloy, 2014; Scalora et al., 2002a; Scalora et al.,
2002b). However, literature remains vague with respect to specific relations between target
dispersion, multiple primary targets, and change in target focus.
Individuals might target multiple people or might engage in target dispersion (i.e.,
individuals share their grievance about the target with third parties over the course of their
harassment). It should be considered whether the presence of multiple parties, in addition to
target dispersion, increases risk. A second consideration is whether individuals who are third
parties become an additional target over the course of the targeted violence activity. Similarly,
practitioners need to determine whether the subject changes the target focus (e.g., decrease the
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risk for one target but an increase in risk towards another). The MFTA model might assist in
offering additional information about the association of any of these factors and physical
approach.
A related difficulty is when an individual targets an institution or just unspecified people
in the community. Many practitioners struggle to design management plans for individuals that
threaten a diffused type of target (i.e., not identifiable individuals). However, anecdotal evidence
indicates that some individuals might show similar attack behaviors regardless of whether they
have a particular target in mind (Fein et al., 2002).
2.3.5. Risk enhancers of intensity of effort. Risk enhancers of intensity of effort are
factors that enhance and moderate the behavioral trajectories associated with intensity of effort.
These factors are not indicative of intensity of effort in themselves. However, individuals who
presented these factors and engaged in behavioral activity suggestive of intensity of effort are
more prone to physically approach and attack the target (Scalora, et al., 2002; Scalora et al.,
2003). Next, a list of potential risk enhancers is offered.
2.3.5.1. Subjects’ symptoms of mental illness and communication themes. Individuals
with symptoms of major mental illness who expressed personal grievances contacted their targets
more frequently and were more likely to display higher intensity of effort and physically
approach the target (Baumgartner et al., 2001; Dietz & Martell, 2010; Marquez & Scalora, 2011;
Meloy et al., 2012; Scalora et al, 2002a; Scalora et al., 2003).
Personal grievances can remain largely unresolved over time often become central to the
subjects’ life and are often associated with the conviction that violence is the only resort (Borum,
2015; Horgan, 2008; Meloy, Hoffmann, Roshdi, & Guldinmann, 2014). Subjects with symptoms
of mental illness, who view their personal grievance as central to their life, often spend

32
increasing amounts of time engaging in problematic communications that are directed towards
the target and potentially towards third parties (see Scalora et al., 2002a; Scalora & Marquez,
2011; Schoeneman, et al., 2007; Schoeneman et al., 2011). When problematic activity associated
with a personal grievance and symptoms of mental illness increases, the subject has the potential
to escalate towards more intimidating behaviors and even violence (see Meloy et al., 2014).
2.3.5.2. Threats and intensity of effort. Overall, threats rarely preceded acts of targeted
violence (see Meloy, 2014). However, the correlation between threats and violence becomes
significant when the target and the subject of concern have an intimate relationship between
them (i.e., intimacy effect, Calhoun & Weston, 2003). Thus, research with community samples
that are predominantly comprised by ex-intimate stalkers shows that substance use, employment
issues, and prior threats to the victims predicted physical violence (Rosenfeld, 2004).
Interestingly, violent stalkers that target an intimate partner rarely exhibited psychotic symptoms
or prior violent convictions (James & Farnham, 2003; Rosenfeld, 2004).
In workplace environments, threats also have a correlation with violent behavior, but it
seems that they occur simultaneously (see Oksanen, Kaltiala-Heino, Holkeri, & Lindberg, 2015).
Women tend to experience sexualized threats, while men often experience threats against their
well-being (Hatch-Maillette et al., 2007). Threats often occur face-to-face and the risk of these
threats evolving into violence increases when the individuals present symptoms of a major
mental illness (Oksanen et al., 2015).
2.3.5.3. Pre-attack activity. Pre-attack activity is often indicative of behaviors that aim at
gaining proximity with the victim in order to carry out an attack (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999).
However, Meloy and his colleagues (2012) described other signs related to intensity of effort that
are proximate to violence but were not directed at the target. For example, these authors noted
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that individuals’ violent acts against non-targeted others might be an attempt to rehearse violent
behavior (i.e., novel aggression). Similarly, the authors noted that increased fixation in
connection with homicidal ideation is also linked to intensity of effort and violence (see Meloy,
2014). In these situations, individuals who showed higher intensity of effort also displayed a
warrior mentality. These individuals might dress like a member of the military, drill like a
soldier, and develop the mentality that soldiers need to kill other human beings in wartime
(Holmes & Holmes, 1992).
2.3.5.4. Future steps: testing threat assessment interventions. Future studies should
incorporate the impact of management interventions in the evolution of problematic behavioral
activity. For example, the MFTA model could test whether the level of intervention mediates the
transition of problematic behavior into physical approach. Based on a prior study (ViñasRacionero et al., 2016a), this study hypothesizes that variations of the current MFTA model
would be useful in incorporating the effects of the management interventions into the mediation
model. Therefore, the next sections will offer an overview of such interventions.
IV. Threat Assessment and Management Strategies
1. Legal/Policy Background Context
According to the Restatement of Torts, educational settings, such as universities, have the
legal duty to prevent harm stemming from the individuals affiliated to the educational institution
and to protect those individuals who are lawfully in their premises (i.e., sections 40 and 41 of the
Third Reinstatement of Torts) (Nolan, Knapp, McAndrew, Randazzo, & Deisinger, 2011).
Threat assessment and management activities are part of the universities efforts to fulfill this
legal obligation.
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Cornell and Allen (2011) noted that protection against potential violence is better
accomplished with threat assessment approaches rather than “zero tolerance” policies. The later
is a punitive approach that applies sanctions indiscriminately without considering whether the
sanction could increase the likelihood of future violence (see Calhoun & Weston, 2003). On the
other hand, threat assessment is a preventive approach that intervenes with a subject in a manner
that is consistent with the seriousness of a threat and reduces the use of severe sanctions such as
long-term suspensions (Cornell, Sheras, Gregory, & Fan 2009; Summer, Beretvas, Svinivki, &
Goring, 2005). The first advantage of this proactive approach is the potential to identify
individuals at risk for violence before any damage occurs. The second advantage is that threat
assessment decreases the risk for targeted violence by offering solutions rather than punishing
problematic individuals. The third advantage is the possibility to extend the use of threat
assessment to all individuals affiliated to educational settings. For example, threat assessment is
not only adequate to evaluate behavior from students of concern but it is also useful to assess
concerning behavior from faculty and staff (Randazzo & Plummer, 2009).
Most settings follow different guidelines when establishing their threat assessment
services. One example of threat assessment guidelines in educational settings is the Virginia
guidelines, which were developed after the mass-shooting incident at Virginia Tech Institute
(Cornell et al., 2009). According to these guidelines, the threat assessment process starts when a
threat is reported and professionals decide whether the threat is founded and unfounded. Cornell
and his colleagues (2004) found that most of threats reported to authorities in k-12 settings were
transient/unfounded whereas only a minority were substantive/founded threats that required
further intervention (70% vs. 30%). The nature of subsequent intervention is tailored to the
severity of the threat.
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When a threat is founded, professionals start gathering information about the threat.
Randazzo and Plummer (2009) suggested that a case manager should be appointed to monitor the
case, to gather information from collateral sources, and to consult with other professionals in the
area of threat assessment. Next, non-restricting intervention measures might be utilized in order
to reduce the occurrence of problematic behavior (e.g., students affairs could help a problematic
student to navigate a conflict with faculty in order to graduate). These measures might include
coordinating with services that help the individual overcome his or her issues. If the risk
increases, professionals restrict the individual’s ability to carry out the threat through direct
interventions, which could include measures such as a mental health hospitalization, an arrest, or
a legal citation.
Obviously, this process will not follow the same sequence in crisis-based scenarios where
immediate protective action is necessary. For example, an individual with homicidal ideation and
paranoid delusions might pose an imminent threat to a person. This individual might be arrested
while carrying a weapon on his or her way to kill the target. As a result of his or her symptoms,
this person might be hospitalized for treatment. During treatment, further threat assessment
information gathering will continue to monitor the level of threat that this person poses to the
target during and after mental health intervention. A schema of the process of threat assessment
is next showed in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Model of threat management adapted from Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, & Jimerson (2010)
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2. Types of Threat Assessment and Management Activities
2.1. Reporting threats
A timely report of a concerning behavior is one of the most crucial aspects of threat
assessment. The advantage of a timely report is twofold. First, it would provide information
about concerning behavior in the early stages. Second, it would give threat assessment
professionals enough time to subsequently monitor and intervene. However, individuals often
fail to report concerning behaviors in a timely manner (Hollister, Scalora, Hoff, & Marquez,
2014). In these situations, initial reports are only “snapshots” of the current problematic behavior
that do not allow comprehending the whole problematic activity or how imminent violence
might be.
In order to overcome this challenge, communities in general and educational institutions
in particular are implementing informative campaigns that aid in reporting. These campaigns are
designed to trigger reporting from individuals who are less likely to report concerning behaviors
or threatening situations.
There are several factors that have been associated with unwillingness to report. First,
males appeared to report potential threats less than females (Cass & Mallicoat, 2014; Hollister et
al., 2014). Second, individuals were less likely to report their partners or ex-partners to
authorities (Cass & Mallicoat, 2014). Third, individuals were less likely to report the threats to
authorities when they are scared and feel less connected to the campus setting (Hollister et al.,
2014; Sulkowski, 2006). Last, individuals with self-reported delinquency and negative peers
were less likely to notify of potential threats to authorities (Brank et al., 2007; Hollister et al.,
2014; Sulkowski, 2006).
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2.2. Investigative/assessment activity
Reports are often “snapshots” that sometimes offer limited information about the threat
activity. For this reason, threat assessment professionals need to assess the severity and
imminence of violence at the time of reporting and start monitoring and gathering information
about the concerning behavior (see Storey, Gibas, Reeves, & Hart, 2011).
2.2.1. Monitoring. Approximately 75% of universities in the nation have their own law
enforcement or public safety departments (Reaves, 2008). Fein et al. (2002) explained that most
of the threat assessment investigations are initiated and controlled by these departments.
However, other individuals might also act as investigators in threat assessment cases (e.g., school
threat assessment teams). Regardless of whether law enforcement or threat assessment teams
take the lead of the investigation, a first step is to appoint a case manager that would work as a
point of contact between threat assessment professionals and the subject of concern. The case
manager investigates the reports and starts to gather information on the circumstances
surrounding concerning behavior. Based on the information gathering results, it is decided
whether the person of concern poses a threat to another person or institution (i.e., the reported
threat is founded).
Upon receiving a report of concerning behavior, monitoring activity (or information
gathering) starts with the follow-up interviews with target and collateral sources of information
(see Calhoun & Weston, 2006; Fein et al., 2002). All investigative activities are documented in
an incident tracking system that could be accessed at any time by the threat assessment teams or
the department of law enforcement (if they are the ones conducting the investigation).
Monitoring should continue until the threat is no longer active. Then, the case is declared
inactive.
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Common monitoring activities consist of interviews with the target, the person of
concern, and the individuals who regularly interact either with the target or the person of concern
such as peers, superiors (i.e., boss, supervisor, faculty, etc.), parent/guardians, or partners. Other
activities might involve contact with the main stakeholders on campuses. Contact with these
stakeholders often provides adequate information of the major problems that need to be
controlled and addressed in a particular university. Information from these stakeholders might
also inform about potential resources for target protection.
2.2.2. Obtaining outside information. Calhoun & Weston (2006) noted the importance of
establishing liaisons with other agencies and sharing information about a threat assessment case.
An individual could have prior threat activity that might have been documented by other
agencies. Similarly, an individual of concern might have prior criminal records in other states.
Law enforcement agencies from these states might have important information for the
management of this individual. In addition, information on the areas of risk assessment and
management might be shared through consultation with specific experts. For example, threat
assessment teams might be consulted during an investigation or outside experts might be reached
during the investigative process.
Information can also be shared among the members of a threat assessment team. Sharing
information and consultation among its members are excellent strategies given the complexity of
threat management. Often, cases involve a multidisciplinary response to the individual of
concern that requires the involvement of law enforcement, dean of students, student affairs
representatives, academic affairs, legal counsel, human resources, and mental health consultants
(Randazzo & Plummer, 2009). Establishing protocols for handling cases and sharing information
within a threat assessment team is key for successful management of cases.
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Protocols for sharing information need to be designed in consonance with Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act laws (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPPA) (Fein et al., 2002). If an individual poses an imminent risk to the life
of another individual and the receiver of such a report is a mental health professional, the duty to
protect would override any limitations in confidentiality (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, 551 P.2d 334).
2.2.3. Threat Assessment Team Consultation. Threat assessment teams are often
utilized to make appropriate consultations and to decide how an intervention will be conducted.
There are different models of threat assessment teams, most of them stemming from the models
developed by Delworth in 1989 (Assessment-Intervention of Student Problems, AISP). In school
settings, as a minimum, these teams consist of a school administrator, a law enforcement
representative, and one or more mental health professionals (Cornell & Allen, 2011). These
teams meet regularly and serve as consultants with respect to assessing and intervening with
troubling individuals or situations (Dunkle, Silverstein, & Warmer, 2008).
There is some variation in the role and nature of threat assessment teams (see
Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage, 2008; Sokolow & Lewis, 2008). If they have a more
active role, they are in charge of the triage of cases (i.e., finding the cases founded or unfounded)
and deciding subsequent intervention (Cornell & Allen, 2011; Eells & Rockland-Miller, 2001).
Given the multidisciplinary nature of threat assessment teams, they could offer advice about
legal options, individual’s involvement in mental heath services, and appropriate academic or
disciplinary actions.
Another common function of a threat assessment team is to offer recommendations for
appropriate management of the case, and then the case managers are usually the ones who
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implement these recommendations. Therefore, these teams might focus only on the most
challenging cases once they have been notified that there is a substantial threat against an
individual or institution. The nature of a team recommendation might vary according to the
investigation’s needs.
2.4. Management interventions (and continued monitoring)
Management interventions are often offered in combination. Cases are rarely handled
with a single strategy. In addition, even if cases are on an intervention phase, continued
assessment should be employed to note the evolution of the individual(s) of concern. Usually,
threat management always starts with non-confrontational intervention and then escalates to
incorporate confrontational (direct) interventions if the individual of concern still persists (see
Calhoun & Weston, 2006).
2.4.1. Target-focused interventions. One of the first management strategies is to develop
a basic target-focused intervention (see Jordan, Wilcox, Pritchard, 2007). Threat assessment
teams or law enforcement often trains the target to cut off contact with the person of concern and
keep the evidence in case the contact re-starts (Meloy, 1998; Miller, 2012). A second set of
measures is designed to enlist help from the target’s social network such as family members,
coworkers, faculty, or the school administration (e.g., Storey & Hart, 2011). Research has shown
that help from family and friends attenuates the negative effects of harassment dynamics
(Geistman, Smith, Lambert, & Cluse-Tolar, 2013).
If the problematic behavior is severe or the level of concern for the target’s well-being
increases, the target is instructed to pursue legal options so criminal charges are filed against the
person of concern (Miller, 2012). Direct intervention with the subject will be provided in
conjunction with these strategies.
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2.4.2. Non-restrictive subject-focused management interventions. Non-restrictive
interventions are the type of interventions that aim at de-escalating the subject’s risk for violence
without the need to impose any restriction on the subject’s behavior. These interventions are
often defined as “soft” or “indirect” because they utilize the setting resources to address the
concerning behavior without the need to resort to more intense strategies that require the
intervention of the criminal justice system (see Scalora et al., 2008).
In a school setting, developing specific environmental contingencies to de-escalate the
subject of concern’s behavior might suffice to reduce the risk against a particular target.
Decreasing the risk for future violence is often accomplished by reducing the contact with the
target while redirecting the individual to services that can assist in mitigating the individual’s
grievance. For example, if a student has a conflict with faculty due to grades, the student could
be referred to academic services or an academic advisor that could help the student overcome his
or her problems. If the student refuses or fails to fulfill the academic services requirement, more
direct measures could be used such as voluntary leave of absence, interim suspension, or
voluntary withdrawal (Dunkle et al., 2008).
In these instances, the case manager’s interviews with the subject of concern help to
monitor their behavior during the intervention (Storey & Hart, 2011). In addition, the dissuasive
presence of law enforcement might be enough deterrent for the individual. Some individuals
might stop their problematic contact if they feel watched by law enforcement. In these cases,
there might not be a need for further restriction of their behavior.
2.4.3. Restrictive subject-focused behavioral interventions. Interventions aiming at
restricting individuals’ behavior should be used as a last resort. Once other interventions fail or if
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the risk for violence increases, case managers need to pursue more intense and direct
interventions with the individuals.
A first set of interventions might be a meeting with law enforcement, human resources,
student affairs, and/or academic affairs to notify the subject that, if his or her behavior does not
change, an appropriate sanction would be used (e.g., suspension, expulsion, or pursue legal
charges).
The most intense and direct interventions are the ones that deal with obtaining a
restraining order against the individual or even arresting this individual (McKenzie & James,
2011), as well as requesting mandatory treatment for the individual of concern if severe
symptoms of major mental illness are suspected (Margolis & Shtull, 2012; Perloe & Pollard,
2016).
Mental health professionals specialized in threat assessment can act as consultants
(Cornell & Allen, 2011; Farkas & Tsukayama, 2012) or even as evaluators for different types of
violence risk (see Mullen et al., 2006). In these cases, monitoring the individuals’ responsivity to
treatment and readiness to change is crucial (MacKenzie & James, 2011). If individuals do not
show compliance with risk reduction efforts, a Tarassoff warning, voluntary and involuntary
hospitalization or even civil commitment options might be considered (Borum & Reddy, 2001;
Margolis & Shtull, 2012).
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CHAPTER II. THE CURRENT STUDY AND METHODS
I. The Current Study
The multifactorial model of threat assessment activity (MFTA) was developed based on
prior theory and research findings. A study has found support for the MFTA model in a sample
of threat assessment cases in which elected officials were targeted (Viñas-Racionero et al.,
2016). The current study hypothesizes that this model will also yield significant results on a
sample of threat assessment cases affecting an educational institution. In this model, physical
(re)approach is considered the outcome variable and a proxy for violence.
Consistent with prior findings (McGuire & Wraith, 2000), the current study estimates that
most threat assessment cases occurring in educational settings will involve individuals with a
prior relationship that are affiliated to the educational institutions. Given that the subject of
concern and the target are likely to have a past relationship, the current study suggests that
individuals of concern will justify their concerning behavior based revenge against the target or a
sense of failure, which typically are categorized as personal grievances (see Drysdale et al.,
2010; Morgan & Kavanaugh, 2011; Vossekuil et al., 2002). In addition, the target might fail to
report the problematic behavior at its onset if the subject of concern is someone that the target
already knew (Hollister et al., 2014). Therefore, it is hypothesized that problematic behavior has
persisted over time before it was reported. Once behaviors of concern are reported to the proper
authorities, it is expected that threat assessment professionals will monitor most of the cases,
which are estimated to involve non-threatening or threatening unwanted communications rather
than face-to-face approaches (see Hoffmann, Meloy, Guldimann, & Emer, 2011). Face-to-face
approach is considered a proxy for violent behavior.
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Given the potentially violent outcome of face-to-face interactions, an important aspect to
consider is whether individuals who engaged in approach behaviors are different from
individuals who do not resort to such severe problematic behavior. It is hypothesized that
approachers might be more likely to present prior criminal history and present symptoms of
major mental illness (i.e., delusions, hallucinations, or thought disorder), which is consistent with
prior studies (Cohen et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2010). Most of these cases are likely to be justified
by personal grievances that will be shared with multiple parties (i.e., target dispersion) (Reddy et
al., 2001). This study also estimates that individuals with the aforementioned characteristics, who
display physical approach or uttered threats, will be more likely to receive subject-focused
interventions. Target-focused interventions with no subject-focused interventions are therefore
likely to be implemented when subjects of concern engage in non-threatening unwanted
communications but not in face-to-face contacts or threats.
This study does not expect differences on the subject characteristics and target factors
depending on whether approach occurred before or after a report was made to proper authorities.
However, this study expects fluctuations between the rates of face-to-face contact before and
after a report was made to law enforcement. It is hypothesized that face-to-face contacts with the
target will decrease after a report to the proper authorities has been made. Specially, when threat
assessment professionals utilized subject-focused interventions.
Once the significant associations between physical approach and the rest of the model
factors are examined, the current study will test MFTA model via structured equation model. As
a novelty from prior studies, the current study will incorporate the impact of threat assessment
interventions on the outcome variable (physical approach). The tested model is displayed in
Figure 4.

Figure 4
Multifactorial model of threat assessment activity for educational settings
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II. Objectives and Study Hypotheses
Objective 1: To provide descriptive statistics for various factors within the MFTA
model of threat assessment.
Hypothesis 1: According to the literature, the majority of subjects of concern would
be individuals affiliated to the educational institution who had a prior relationship with the
target.
Hypothesis 2: The majority of the cases will involve target dispersion.
Hypothesis 3: The majority of reported grievances will contain personal themes
(i.e., help-seeking requests, personal entitlement issues, personal rights issues, delusional
problems, personal safety concerns, and recent life stressors).
Hypothesis 4: The majority of the targets will fail to report the concerning behavior
to threat assessment professionals during the first 24 hours after the behavior occurred.
Hypothesis 5: The majority of cases will involve non-threatening unwanted
communications. Less than half of the cases will present with problematic face-to-face
approach or threats.
Hypothesis 6: A substantial majority of the cases will have monitoring activity as a
default threat assessment strategy. Approximately half of the cases will include nonrestrictive management strategies and less than 30% of the cases will require interventions
that restrict individuals’ behavior.
Objective 2: To assess which factors best predict physical approach and direct
intervention as suggested by the model.
Hypothesis 7: Individuals of concern who engaged in face-to-face problematic
interactions will differ from individuals who do not engage in such behavior. Individuals
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who engaged in face-to-face problematic interaction will be more likely to be mentally ill,
to have a prior criminal record, and to display target dispersion.
Hypothesis 8: Individuals who received interventions aiming at restricting their
behavior will differ from individuals who do not receive such interventions. Individuals
who receive interventions aiming at restricting their behavior will more likely be mentally
ill and have a past criminal record. These individuals will be also more likely to present
with higher rates of face-to-face problematic interactions, direct threats, and a higher
number of contacts with the target over time.
Objective 3: To assess change in physical approach behavior over time.
Hypothesis 9: There will be no differences in the subject characteristics, target
factors, or communication themes that predict physical approach before and after a report
was made to law enforcement (i.e., mental illness, criminal history, personal grievance, and
target dispersion).
Hypothesis 10: It is hypothesized that the number of face-to-face problematic
interactions and direct threats will decrease after initial reporting. However, it is also
hypothesized that subjects who persist in contacting the target(s) will do so post initial
report by engaging in unwanted verbal and written communications.
Objective 4: To test the applicability of MFTA model to college educational settings
via path analysis.
Hypothesis 11: The multifactorial model of threat assessment activity will be tested
via a structure equation model. It is expected that the model will yield adequate indices of
local and global fit. It is hypothesized that prior relationship, mental illness, criminal
history, personal grievances, target dispersion, and persistence of problematic behavior
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over time will contribute to the structural equation model in a significant manner (e.g.,
significant direct effects).
Hypothesis 12: A decrease in physical approach behavior will be contingent upon
the use of subject-focused management interventions. Statistically, the decrease of physical
approach behavior that occurred after a law enforcement report will be tested via mediation
between pre and post problematic behavior (e.g., 95% CI indirect effects will not contain
zero).
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III. Methods
1. Data Source and Procedure
Data for this study was drawn from 332 designated threat assessment cases from a
Midwestern University Police that occurred between May 2006 and July 2016. Any
suspicious activity that occurs at the university or involves any individual affiliated to the
university is reported to the university police. This law enforcement office investigates,
assesses, and manages individuals and situations that have the potential to escalate into
further violence.
Data collection was completed by a team consisting of University of Nebraska
(UNL) researchers who were trained to properly identify the research variables and code
information from the records. Each case took between one and 15 hours to be coded. All
data were collected in the de-identified manner.
2. Data Selection and Variable Description
The 332 cases included in the present study involved concerning behavior,
including threatening or inappropriate contact with individuals affiliated to the university
and/or any threat against the educational institution. In these cases, trained law enforcement
investigators conducted preliminary investigations to determine whether the reported cases
were founded or unfounded. Only cases that were deemed founded were included in the
current sample (i.e., cases that warranted further investigative and intervention activity). A
total of 56 cases were not included in the study because they were deemed unfounded (n =
40), involved suicidal ideation or attempts but not threat to others (n = 3), encompassed
documentation for sex offender registry but no active threat was detected (n = 6), or
centered on individuals that were known to the coders (n = 7).
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Characteristics of the individuals, targets, and problematic behavior were extracted
from actual documents and investigative law enforcement reports. A total of 52 variables
were coded for the purposes of this study. The variables were divided into 5 subsections
depending on whether they belong into the individuals of concern, the target, the
communicated grievance, problematic behavior, and management interventions. These
variables are described below. Kappa and Intraclass Correlation Coefficients were used to
assess the level of interrater agreement on all 52 variables (see data analytic section and
Appendix I).
2.1. Individuals’ characteristics (12 variables)
Individuals’ characteristics encompassed basic socio-demographic variables,
including gender, age, and ethnicity (no interrater information is provided since the
information in these variables was part of the law enforcement case file and no
measurement of agreement is needed). Furthermore, variables related to the relationship
between the person of concern and the target (i.e., stranger, acquaintance, friend, family,
partner/ex-partner), affiliation to campus (i.e., affiliated to the institution vs. non-affiliated),
use of an alias, prior violent history with target, prior criminal history, symptoms of mental
illness (i.e., delusions, hallucinations, and thought disorder), substance use and a history of
suicidality, and a history of homicidality were included. All these variables were coded in a
dichotomous manner (presence/absence) except age (count variable) and ethnicity (nominal
variable).
An individual was considered as having a direct affiliation to the university when
the individual was a current student, faculty, or a staff member of the university. An
individual was considered an outsider if that person did not have a current direct affiliation
to the university.
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Prior violence towards the target was determined to have happened when the target
alleged being a victim of physical or sexual violence at the hands of the subject of concern,
regardless of whether there was a conviction for these actions. Instead, the individual was
considered to have a prior criminal history if he has been convicted of at least one crime.
Convictions appeared on law enforcement records (i.e., law enforcement officers routinely
checked National Crime Information Center records, NCIC).
An individual was considered to evidence signs and/or symptoms of mental illness
if that person exhibited overt and gross symptoms of severe mental illness including
delusions, hallucinations, or thought disorder, and available corroborating documentation
existed affirming that the subject suffered from such symptoms (e.g., prior mental health
providers’ diagnosis). Substance use was coded as present when the reports indicated prior
treatment or diagnosis of substance use, direct evidence of intoxication, or when collateral
records note that substance use was a concern.
The level of interrater agreement for the individuals’ characteristics ranged from .40
to 1.00. Three variables showed poor interrater agreement (drug use, history of suicidality,
and history of homicidality), as these historical variables were not always very well
captured on records (e.g., history of drug use is not always detectable unless the subject
admits to this history or is observed being under the influence). In these three cases, poor
agreement appeared to be explained by the scarcity of information rather than by raters’
inability to identify these variables in a consistent manner.
2.2. Target factors (5 variables)
Target factors comprised four variables related to the number of targets (i.e., single
target, multiple targets, institution as target, institution and multiple individuals being
targeted), the affiliation of the target to the university (e.g., student, faculty, administrator,
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staff, or the institution in general), the presence of target dispersion, the type of grievance
receivers, and the lapse of time between when the problematic behavior occurred and when
the target decided to report the behavior to law enforcement. The lapse of time is an ordinal
variable (1 = less than 24 hours, 2 = 2-7 days, 3 = one week to a month, 4 = more than one
month), whereas the other three variables are dichotomous (presence/absence) or nominal
variables (i.e., type of targets).
In cases of target dispersion, individuals pursued a particular target but shared the
grievance against this target with third parties. Target dispersion was differentiated from
the presence of multiple primary targets. Cases with multiple primary targets are those in
which individuals have different grievances directed towards different people.
The level of interrater agreement for the target factors ranged from .57 to .77, with
only one variable showing poor interrater reliability (i.e., types of grievance receivers
below .70).
2.3. Grievance-Communication themes (4 variables)
When the subject communicates a grievance, the specific themes of the individuals’
verbalizations or messages were analyzed. The themes of the grievances were analyzed and
coded in three dichotomous variables (presence/absence). A grievance was considered to be
personal when the individual communicated help-seeking requests, personal entitlement
issues, personal rights issues, delusional problems, personal safety concerns, and recent life
stressors. Target-focused grievances were defined as those in which the individual debased
the target or made comments against the educational institution. Social issues driven
grievances were considered to be present when the individuals reported racist or sexist
ideas. The duration of the grievance was coded dichotomously (presence/absence) in a
longitudinal fashion using 3-month intervals over a two-year period (i.e., 3 months, 6
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months, 9 months, 12 months, 15 months, 18 months, 21 months, 24 months, and
+24months periods).
The average interrater agreement for all communication themes ranged from .54 to
.79. Only the target-focused grievances showed poor levels of interrater agreement, which
seemed to be caused by the low prevalence of this communication theme in the interrater
subsample. Therefore, minimal deviations resulted in poor interrater reliability values.
2.4. Problematic behavior (12 variables)
Problematic behavior was coded separately for the target and for third parties that
were also affected by the individuals’ actions (i.e., non-targeted others). Non-targeted
others were harassed when the individuals shared the grievance with them (i.e., target
dispersion). For example, grievance receivers were faculty, students, student administrative
services, or employment services that deal with the disgruntled student or employee on a
daily basis. On a few occasions, these grievance receivers were individuals in the
community that were harassed by individuals who posed a generalized risk to others in
addition to the people affiliated to the university. These grievance receivers might be the
receptors of problematic contact given the accessibility and opportunity rather than because
of their actions or characteristics.
Problematic behavior comprised eight count variables, which encompassed the
contact locations (i.e., on and/or off campus) as well as behaviors of concern, including
unwanted written communications (i.e., letters/written materials, computer contacts, and
text messages), verbal communications (i.e., phone calls or voicemail), threats, public
statements, object delivered, physical approach/face-to-face interactions, and physical
assaults (i.e., actual or attempted with and without a weapon). Leakage of violent ideation
related to homicidal ideation, suicidal ideation, or attacks with weapons was coded as part
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of problematic behavior. Each of these behaviors were coded in separate points in time in
order to assess change in behavior (e.g., before and after a report has been made to law
enforcement).
The level of interrater agreement for the contact locations within the college campus
was .87 and outside campus was .60. The level of the raters’ consistency for the individuals
problematic behavior for targets and third parties ranged from .68 to .99, and for the
individuals’ leakage of violent ideation ranges from .70 to .91.
2.5. Threat assessment process (19 variables)
Assessment and management strategies were coded based on the purpose of each
strategy. The length of monitoring and indirect intervention as well as the length of direct
intervention was coded by counting the number of months.
It was determined that the Monitoring and information gathering strategies started
when law enforcement investigated and collected information about the subject of concern
with respect to his past history and his current concerning behavior. A total of five
monitoring strategies were coded: law enforcement investigative activity (e.g., phone calls
with target, witnesses, agencies that can offer collateral information), mental health
consultation, consultation with other law enforcement agencies, coordination with student
affairs (information gathering), interview with the subject, and threat assessment team
meeting. All these variables were coded in an ordinal manner depending on how many
times law enforcement case managers resorted to these activities (0= None, 1= 1-5 times,
2= 6-10 times, 3= 11-15 times, 4= 15-20 times, 5= 21+ times). The level of interrater
agreement for the monitoring activity was .84, and for the information gathering strategies
ranged from .62 to .90.
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Target-focused interventions was coded when law enforcement engaged in
interventions designed to gather information about the target’s own protective actions (i.e.,
physical security, legal means, or non-physical security means) and when law enforcement
actively assisted the target in developing a safety plan (e.g., increase physical security,
pursue legal options, or enhance non-physical security means). These variables are coded in
a binary manner (presence/absence). The level of interrater agreement for target-focused
interventions was .78.
Restriction of individuals’ behavior was coded when the case reflects direct efforts
in restricting the subject´s behavior. These strategies involved a direct order given to the
individual in a written or verbal manner stating that he or she should refrain from
approaching or communicating with the target and non-targeted others. Failure to follow
directions would result in some form of action (e.g., expulsion, ban and barred, filing
charges, or arrest). There are seven strategies that were commonly used for restricting
individuals’ behavior: interview with the individual or wellness check, intervention of
students affairs, mental health treatment, meeting with law enforcement, arrest, legal
citation (i.e., filing charges as a result of non-compliance with law enforcement requests),
and other threat management strategies. All these variables were coded in a binary fashion
(presence/absence). The level of interrater agreement for the restrictive interventions
ranged from .66 to .92.
3. Data Analytic Plan
In order to assess the level of interrater agreement, 8% (26 out of 322) of the cases
in the sample were randomly selected and coded by two raters. There were a total of three
raters, and two of them were randomly assigned to each case (i.e., not all the cases were
rated by the same coders). Therefore, reliability of the coding scheme was calculated with
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Kappa for the binary variables and Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC12) that used the
one-way random effects variance model. For continuous and ordinal variables, the
interrater agreement ranged from .60 to .99, with an average of .80. For the nominal and
binary variables, the interrater agreement ranged from .40 to 1.00, with an average of .72
(see Appendix I for further information).
Data analysis for the current study followed three phases. In order to answer the first
six hypotheses, descriptive data was provided, including frequencies, means, standard
deviations, and range. Hypotheses 7 to 10 were answered by using chi-square statistics,
multinomial logistic regression, and t-tests for between-group and within-group designs. In
order to ensure the accuracy of the t-tests results, the assumption of normality was tested
first. If this assumption was violated, the variables’ outliers that fall outside the Tukey’s
hinges were trimmed, and only variables with acceptable skewness and kurtosis values
were used (Skewness ± 3 and Kurtosis ± 10, see Kline, 2011). Second, if Levene’s test
suggested the equality of the variances assumption was violated (i.e., Levene’s test scores
fell below the 0.05 level of significance), the degrees of freedom of the t-tests were
corrected.
In order to answer the hypotheses 11 and 12, data was analyzed using SEM
techniques and Mplus 7.4 software (Muthen & Muthen, 2010). First, correlations for all the
variables in the model were provided. Next, path analysis was conducted to determine the
global and local fit of the structural model using Weighted Least Square (WLS) with Theta
parameterization (model depicted in Figure 4). Multiple indices were used to assess global
model fit. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Root Mean Square Error
of Approximation (RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck, 1993) for the model were reported. For
the CFI, values of .90 or greater reflect adequate fit of the model. For the RMSEA, values
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of .05 or less indicate good fit, values up to .08 indicate reasonable fit, values ranging from
.08-.10 indicate mediocre fit, and values greater than .10 indicate poor fit (MacCallum,
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Once a model was deemed to fit the data adequately,
parameter estimates were interpreted to estimate the local fit.
The next phase of data analysis included a bootstrap approach (Shrout & Bolger,
2002) in order to account for all the indirect effects of all the subject variables, target
factors, communication themes, and pre-intervention problematic behavior on the postintervention change on physical approach/violence when mediated by target-focused
interventions and/or subject-focused interventions (i.e., indirect effects). A bootstrap
approach has the advantage of maximizing power while minimizing Type I error rate.
Bootstrapping provides an empirical approximation of sampling distributions of indirect
effects to produce confidence intervals (CI) of estimates. If zero does not fall within the CI,
one can conclude that an indirect effect is different from zero and therefore the indirect
effect is present. Nonparametric resampling method (bias-corrected bootstrap) with 1000
resamples will be drawn to derive the 95% CIs for the indirect effect of all variables on
problematic physical approach.
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CHAPTER III. RESULTS
I. Individuals of Concern
Most of the threat assessment cases usually involved one problematic individual (n
= 330, 99.04%). On very special occasions, threat assessment professionals attempted to
manage the risk of several individuals of concern (n = 2, 0.6%). For example, cases in
which numerous bloggers from a white supremacist website harassed or threatened a
particular target linked to the educational institution.
The vast majority of problematic individuals were identified during the law
enforcement investigation (n = 324, 97.6%), though a few of them attempted to conceal
their identity by using an alias (n = 13, 3.9%). Only six individuals remained anonymous (n
= 6, 1.8%). Four of these individuals successfully avoided detection (1.2%) and two
managed to remain unknown by using a character name (e.g., “concerned student”).
The identified individuals were mostly Caucasian (n = 235, 70.8%), males (n = 275,
82.8%) with an average age of 32 (M = 32.22, SD = 14.52, Range = 18 to 84). Half of these
problematic individuals presented with psychological problems that ranged in severity and
type (e.g., anxiety, developmental disorders, learning disabilities, mood disorder,
pathological personality traits, psychotic symptoms, etc.) (n = 168, 50.6%), but only a
fourth exhibited active symptoms of severe mental disorder (i.e., hallucinatory
disturbances, delusional ideation, and thought disorganization) (n = 75, 22.6%). Some of
these individuals also had a history of suicidality (n = 60, 18.1%) or homicidality (n = 40,
12%) as well as a history of alcohol (n = 62, 18.7%) or substance use (n = 64, 19.3%).
Approximately a fourth of these problematic individuals had been previously convicted of a
crime (n = 79, 23.8%), and approximately fifteen percent had a violent history with their
targets (n = 54, 16.3%).
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Table 1
Subject socio-demographics, psychiatric history, and criminal history
Subject factors
M(SD)
32.22(14.52)
n(%)

Age
Gender
Male
Female

275(82.8)
42(14.8)

Race
Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African American
Middle-eastern
Hispanic
Native American
Unknown ethnicity
Psychological disturbance
Positive symptoms of psychosis
History of Suicidality
Current suicidal ideation
History of homicidality
Current homicidality
History of alcohol
History of drugs
History of criminal convictions
Prior violence history with the target

235(70.8)
31(9.3)
21(6.3)
6(1.8)
5(1.5)
4(1.2)
30(9)
168(50.6)
75(22.6)
60(18.1)
74(22.3)
40(12)
64(19.3)
62(18.7)
64(19.3)
79(23.8)
54(16.3)

Threat assessment cases proved to be very complex to manage, as the subjects of
concern often engaged in multiples modalities of intrusive behavior (n = 185, 55.7%) while
also reporting a violent intent (n = 237, 71.4%). More than half of the cases involved
unwanted written communications (n = 174, 52.7%) or unwanted physical approach (n =
190, 57.2%), and almost a third of the cases included unwanted verbal communications (n
= 103, 31.2%). In the most extreme cases, individuals manifested their willingness to attack
the target with weapons (n = 62, 18.7%) and/or endorsed homicidal (n = 64, 19.3%) or
suicidal ideation (n = 74, 22.3%). In fact, violence propitiated the opening of the threat
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assessment case in a minority of the cases (physical violence n = 52, 15.7%, and sexual
violence n = 8, 2.4%). On other occasions, these individuals threatened the target (n = 140,
42.2%), which reportedly feared for their safety (n = 157, 47.3%). The targets’ perception
of danger triggered a request for help from threat assessment professionals.
II. The Targets
Primary targets were the people or institutions that the individual of concern
identified in their grievances. These were the intended targets of the problematic activity.
Interestingly, threat assessment cases often involved several targets, including a select
groups of individuals (n = 54, 16.3%), institutions (n = 40, 12%), and multiple individuals
and institutions (n = 106, 31.9%). Less often, these individuals targeted one particularly
named individual (n = 132, 39.8%). The nature of these targets in relation to the college
institutions heavily varied, and that variability is showed in Table 2.

62
Table 2
Type of primary targets based on their relation with the institution

Student
Faculty
Administrator
Staff
Specific facility
College Institution
Society
Target’s family member
POC’s family or partner
Elected officials or
families of elected
officials
Other institutions
Target is a guest at the
college institution
Law enforcement
Other individuals not
affiliated to the college
institution

Single
target
(n = 132)
n(%)
71(53.8)
21(15.9)
6(4.5)
28(21.2)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
3(2.3)
0(0)

Multiple Institution
targets
(n = 40)
(n = 54)
n(%)
n(%)
31(57.4)
0(0)
15(27.8)
0(0)
7(13)
0(0)
14(25.9)
0(0)
0(0)
13(32.5)
0(0)
25(62.5)
6(11.1)
0(0)
6(11.1)
0(0)
8(14.8)
0(0)
2(3.7)
0(0)

Multiple targets
Total
and institutions (N = 332)
(n = 106)
n(%)
n(%)
46(43.4) 148(44.6)
29(27.4) 65(19.6)
19(17.9)
32(9.6)
34(32.1) 76(22.9)
53(50) 66(19.9)
58(54.7)
83(25)
16(15.1)
22(6.6)
3(2.8)
9(2.7)
12(11.3)
23(6.9)
4(3.8)
6(1.8)

0(0)
0(0)

0(0)
0(0)

5(12.5)
0(0)

20(18.9)
2(1.9)

25(7.5)
2(.6)

0(0)
3(2.3)

0(0)
4(7.4)

3(7.5)
0(0)

22(20.8)
5(4.7)

25(7.5)
12(3.6)

As showed in table 2, the targets could be a combination of individuals or particular
locations. The majority of individuals targeted were college students, college staff, or
faculty. In a fourth of cases, the college institution was targeted as a whole and, in a fifth of
the cases, only a specific college facility. The rest of the individuals and locations appeared
at a lower frequency and reflect the variability in targets that normally appeared in these
types of cases.
III. The Locations
Most of the threat assessment cases occurred at different locations on and off the
college campus. The most frequent campus locations included academic buildings (n = 134,
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40.4%), residence halls (n = 72, 21.7%), a recreational building (n = 58, 17.5%) (e.g., union
building, the recreational center, etc.), administrative buildings (n = 56, 16.9%), and
outdoor locations within the college campus (n = 38, 11.4%). Threatening activity could
also extend to other off campus locations, such as the individual of concern’s residence (n =
89, 26.8%) and other off-campus locations (n = 119, 35.8%) (e.g., law enforcement head
quarters, the street, targets’ residence, etc.).
Analyses related to each of the objectives and hypotheses follow.
IV. Objective 1: To Provide Descriptive Statistics for Various Factors within the
MFTA Model of Threat Assessment.
Hypothesis 1: According to the literature, the majority of subjects of concern
would be individuals affiliated to the educational institution who had a prior relationship
with the target.
This hypothesis was supported. Consistent with the tenet of the first hypothesis, the
majority of individuals of concern were affiliated to the educational institution (n = 254,
76.5%). More than half of the problematic individuals were problematic students (n = 206,
62%) (i.e., n = 175, 52.7% current students, n = 26, 7.8% former students, and n = 5, 1.5%
applicants). Less often, these individuals were employees of the institution (n = 48, 14.4%),
such as staff (n = 36, 10.8%) and faculty members (n = 12, 3.6%). Only in a fifth of the
cases were the individuals of concern not part of the college institution (n = 73, 21.9%).
These cases included individuals with no association to the college institution (n = 41,
12.3%) (e.g., an angry fan of an athletic team) and relatives or partners/ex-partners of
others affiliated to the institution (n = 32, 9.6%). This last type of case often involved
instances of family or partner violence that extended to the educational setting.
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In accordance with the second tenet of this first study hypothesis, most individuals
of concern targeted someone they knew (n = 264, 79.5% vs. n = 65, 19.6% cases only
involving strangers as targets). Given that individuals of concern often targeted multiple
individuals (n = 199, 59.9%), Table 3 offers a break down on the individual of concerntarget relationship depending on the number of targets in each case.
Table 3
Relationship between the individual of concern and the target

Stranger
Acquaintance
Friend
Family
Partner/ex-partner

Single
target
(n = 132)
n(%)
23(17.6)
64(48.9)
11(8.5)
2(1.5)
30(22.9)

Multiple
targets*
(n = 54)
n(%)
19(35.2)
30(55.6)
5(9.3)
7(13)
23(42.6)

Institution* Multiple targets
Total**
(n = 40) and institutions* (N = 332)
(n = 106)
n(%)
n(%)
n(%)
30(76.9)
70(66) 142(42.8)
23(59)
69(65.1)
186(56)
1(2.6)
9(8.5)
26(7.8)
0(0)
12(11.3)
21(6.3)
0(0)
15(14.2) 68(20.5)

*Note: cases involving multiple targets and/or institutions have percentages exceeding 100% due to multiple
relationships with the different targets in a case.
**Note: In two cases the relationship between the subject of concern and the target could not be determined

Hypothesis 2: The majority of the cases will involve target dispersion.
While the second hypothesis of this study was not supported, a significant
proportion of cases involved target dispersion (n = 156, 47%). Target dispersion mostly
occurred when the problematic individual shared his or her grievance with third parties
through face-to-face problematic interactions (n = 57, 36.5%, MD = 1.17, SD = 2.47) or via
unwanted written communications (n = 63, 40.4%, MD = 5.23, SD = 13.36), verbal contacts
(n = 53, 34%, MD = 1.04, SD = 2.01), or threats (n = 50, 32.1%, MD = .65, SD = 1.44). On
a few occasions, these interactions escalated into assaults (n = 12, 7.7%, MD = .12, SD =
.47). Much less often, target dispersion included stalking behavior (n = 3, 1.9%, MD = .05,
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SD = .42), receiving unwanted gifts (n = 1, .6%, MD = .01, SD = .08), or public defamation
(n = 6, 3.8%, MD = .08, SD = .49).
There were multiple grievance receivers in each case that involve target dispersion.
Approximately 43% of the cases encompassed grievance receivers who did not have a
connection with the college institution (n = 67, 42.9%). Less often, these secondary targets
were university staff (n = 39, 25.2%), other students (n = 30, 19.2%), school administrators
(n = 28, 18.1%), law enforcement (n = 48, 14.8%), faculty (n = 18, 11.6%), the target’s
family members (n = 13, 8.3%), and the person’s of concern family members (n = 10,
6.4%).
The duration of target dispersion heavily varied across cases. In 49 cases (14.8%),
target dispersion comprised a single incident or a series of incidents that only lasted a day.
In 34 cases (10.2%), these secondary targets were contacted at different points over the
course of a week (n = 17, 5.1%) or a month (n = 17, 5.1%). In 32 cases (9.6%), the
individuals continued to pursue these secondary targets between three months and a year. In
34 cases (10.2%), target dispersion activities lasted more than one year.
Hypothesis 3: The majority of reported grievances will contain personal themes,
(i.e., help-seeking requests, personal entitlement issues, personal rights issues, delusional
problems, personal safety concerns, and recent life stressors).
Individuals of concern often endorsed grievances that contained different themes (M
= 3.24 communication themes, SD = 2.44). Consistent with the third hypothesis, more than
half of the grievances reflected an issue that was deeply personal for the individuals of
concern (n = 214, 64.8% vs. n = 117, 35.2% cases that only included target-focused or
social issues related grievances). Table 4 shows all of the communication themes that were
present in the individuals’ problematic communications.
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The most frequently reported personal grievances involved complaints about
different life stressors (n = 145, 43.7%). Less often, personal grievances encompassed
requests for help (n = 94, 28.4%), claims that the individuals’ rights have been violated (n =
85, 25.7%), delusional beliefs (e.g., feeling persecuted) (n = 73, 22.1%), perceptions that
the individuals’ personal safety is at risk (n = 20, 6%), or suggesting that a specific
entitlement or benefit has been denied (n = 11, 3.3%).
Typically, most of the personal grievances were conveyed before the threat
assessment activity was initiated (n = 127, 38.3%). The frequency of the reported personal
grievances decreased after 3 months (n = 57, 17.2%) and remained equal or lower than 10%
after that time (n = 26, 7.8% between 3 and 6 months, n = 17, 5.1% between 6 and 9
months, n = 10, 3% between 9 and 12 months, n = 11, 3.3% between 12 and 15 months, n =
6, 1.8% between 15 to 18 months, n = 4, 1.2% between 18 and 21 months, n = 6, 1.8%
between 21 and 24 months, and n = 8, 2.4% between 24 months until the case became
inactive). As it is shown below, the communication of personal grievances appeared to
decrease as the problematic activity also decreased.
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Table 4
Grievances and communication themes
Communication themes
Personal Grievances
Requesting help
Personal rights have been violated
Delusional-based beliefs
Personal safety at risk
Denied specific entitlement
Life stressors
Interpersonal conflicts
Termination intimate relationship
Recent loses (e.g., job, promotion, housing, etc.)
Work performance declined
Poor academic performance
Legal problems
Worsening of mental health
Medical concern
Financial stressors
Past traumatic events
Stressors with no clear theme (e.g., feeling anxious)
Target-focused grievances
Threatening language
Harassment/Degradation/Insult
Sexual comments towards the target
Obscenities
Anti-university
Social issues-related grievances
Racist comments
Justified violence
Religious themes
Sexist

n(%)
94(28.4)
85(25.7)
73(22.1)
20(6)
11(3.3)
145(43.7)
40(27.4)
28(19.3)
24(16.4)
23(15.8)
22(15.1)
12(8.3)
11(7.6)
9(6.2)
7(4.8)
5(3.4)
19(13.1)
153(46.2)
118(35.6)
93(28.1)
54(16.3)
38(11.5)
26(7.9)
24(7.3)
20(6)
15(4.5)

Hypothesis 4: The majority of the targets will fail to report the concerning
behavior to threat assessment professionals during the first 24 hours after the behavior
occurred.
The fourth hypothesis was supported. Overall, the majority of targets reported
instances of harassment and other problematic behavior within the first 24 hours of the last
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occurrence of such behavior (n = 188, 56.6%). However, this reported incident rarely
occurred at the onset of problematic activity. A nuanced analysis of the data indicated two
different reporting patterns depending on whether the cases had an abrupt onset of
problematic behavior (n = 136, 42.8%) or followed a pattern of escalation over time (n =
182, 56.9%).
Approximately 40% of the threat assessment cases were opened immediately after
the individual of concern started displaying behaviors that threatened the target’s safety (n
= 136, 42.8%). The onset of this behavior rarely lasted more than a day (n = 117, 86.03%)
and, on 67% of the occasions, the targets reported these behaviors within the first 24 hours
(n = 92, 67.2%). The remaining individuals reported problematic behavior within the first
week (n = 24, 17.5%), within the first month (n = 12, 8.8%), or after one month (n = 9,
6.6%).
Almost 60% of the cases escalated in severity until the target feared for his or her
well-being (n = 182, 56.9%). The duration of these preliminary forms of problematic
behavior oscillated between one day and thirty years, with an average duration of 3.8
months (DS = 4.9 months) after outliers were trimmed. Once the targets determined that the
contact behavior was severe, they made a report to law enforcement (n = 148, 82.2%).
However, only in half of these cases problematic contact was reported within the first 24
hours (n = 93, 51.4%). The other half of individuals reported the threatening activity to law
enforcement within a week (n = 35, 19.3%), within the first month (n = 26, 14.4%), or after
one month (n = 27, 14.9%).
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Hypothesis 5: The majority of cases will involve non-threatening unwanted
communications. Less than half of the cases will present with problematic face-to-face
approach or threats.
Threatening activity often manifested in multiple behavioral modalities (n = 185,
55.7%) that fluctuated in terms of frequency (M = 11.32, SD = 11.46 contacts per case after
outliers were trimmed, Range = 1 to 1140 contacts) and duration (M = 6.77 months, SD =
9.64, Range = less than one month to 4.5 years). A close glance at the data revealed the
fifth hypothesis was only partially supported. Consistent with this hypothesis, more than
half of the cases involved unwanted written communications (n = 174, 52.7%), and an
additional 30% involved unwanted verbal communications (n = 103, 31.2%). Similarly,
less than half of the individuals directly threatened their targets (n = 77, 23.2%). However,
contrary to our fifth hypothesis, more than half of the cases involved problematic face-toface contacts with the targets (n = 190, 57.2%). Table 5 shows a summary of different
problem behaviors that encompassed problematic activity.
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Table 5
Behaviors during threatening activity
Absence
Presence
n(%)
n(%)
M(SD)* Min Max
Written communications
157(47.3) 175(53.7) 25.42(93.52)
1 1114
Verbal communications
227(68.4) 105(31.6) 20.38(80.92)
1 747
Public statements
306(92.2)
26(7.8)
1.64(1.19)
1
5
Stalking (surveillance and following) 257(77.4) 75(22.6)
5.82(9.13)
1
63
Objects left/delivered
316(95.2)
16(4.8)
1.53(1.19)
1
5
Direct Threats
225(76.8) 77(23.2)
2.74(3.75)
1
29
Face-to-face staff
296(89.2) 36(10.8)
1.97(2.05)
1
11
Interception law enforcement
293(88.3) 39(11.7)
1.60(1.15)
1
6
Face-to-face target
142(42.8) 190(57.2)
4.11(4.90)
1
40
Physical assault
280(84.3) 52(15.7)
2.92(3.68)
1
24
Sexual assault
324(97.6)
8(2.4)
2.38(2.07)
1
6
Inappropriate sexual behavior
320(96.4)
12(3.6)
6.25(6.11)
1
22
Interest or use of weapons
321(96.7)
11(3.3)
1.63(1.03)
1
4
Acts of self-harm
298(89.8) 34(10.2)
2.21(2.43)
1
10
Property damage
294(88.6) 38(11.4)
1.87(1.60)
1
9
Note: * Outliers have not been trimmed
Hypothesis 6: A substantial majority of the cases will have monitoring activity as
a default threat assessment strategy. Approximately half of the cases will include nonrestrictive management strategies and less than 30% of the cases will require
interventions that restrict individuals’ behavior.
The sixth hypothesis was partially supported. Consistent with this hypothesis, all
cases were monitored by law enforcement as a default threat assessment strategy. The
length of monitoring varied widely in duration, ranging from one day to nine years, with an
average length of 15 months after outliers were trimmed (M = 15.19, SD = 14.75).
In contrast, the use of non-restrictive management strategies widely exceeded our
predictions. In addition to monitoring, a substantial majority of cases needed additional
management strategies to assess the evolution of individuals’ problematic behavior (n =
309, 93.1%). Table 6 shows the most common strategies consisted of interviewing the
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individual of concern as well as coordinating with student affairs, other law enforcement
agencies (e.g., local and federal police), and mental health services. The threat assessment
team often oversaw the investigation, and law enforcement often discussed with the victim
different self-protection strategies. Last, cases often required additional community
resources in order to manage and assess the individuals’ behavior (e.g., legal consultation,
private business cooperation, other public agencies coordination, etc.).
Table 6
Non-restrictive management strategies
Absence
None

Monitored (default)
Threat Assessment Team
Interview/welfare check
Student affairs
Mental health
Other law enforcement
Safety plan with target
Other strategies

n(%)
0(0)
217(65.4)
142(42.8)
192(57.8)
235(70.8)
206(62)
172(51.8)
190(57.2)

1-5
times
n(%)
93(28)
111(33.4)
167(50.3)
108(32.5)
87(26.2)
111(33.4)
150(45.2)
115(34.6)

6-10
times
n(%)
91(27.4)
4(1.2)
19(5.7)
22(6.6)
6(1.8)
11(3.3)
6(1.8)
17(5.1)

Presence
11-15
times
n(%)
57(17.2)
0(0)
3(.9)
3(.9)
2(.6)
1(.3)
1(.3)
3(.9)

15-20
times
n(%)
24(7.2)
0(0)
1(.3)
2(.6)
2(.6)
2(.6)
1(.3)
3(.9)

+ 21
times
n(%)
67(20.2)
0(0)
0(0)
5(1.5)
0(0)
0(0)
1(.3)
2(.6)

Similarly, 69% of cases (n = 229) necessitated direct, restrictive actions in order to
ensure targets’ protection, which vastly exceeded the prediction of 30% of the sixth
hypothesis. Direct interventions were utilized at different points in time, with most cases
needing between one day and eight years to fully implement these strategies (M = 7
months, SD = 9.80, after outliers were trimmed). In addition, approximately half of the
cases combined different interventions at the same time (n = 159, 47.9%, M = 2.85, SD =
1.83). Table 7 displays the different interventions utilized to restrict the individuals’
problematic behaviors. These interventions aimed at informing the individuals of concern
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that they should immediately cease the threatening activity. For example, this message
could be delivered by several emissaries, including threat assessment team members,
college campus police, other law enforcement agencies, student affairs or others’ involved
in the individual’s case. These interventions aim at further taking actions that posed
physical, normative, or legal barriers for the individuals to continue with their behavior
(i.e., involuntary psychiatric hospitalization, voluntary outpatient treatment, arrest,
citations, probation requirements, academic holds/requirements, protection orders, arrests
and incarceration, citations, or different forms of expulsion, suspension or ban from the
college property).
Table 7
Interventions aiming at restricting the individuals’ of concern behavior

Threat Assessment Team
Require individuals to stop their behavior
Interview with Subject
Student Affairs
Other law enforcement agencies
Others’ request to stop behavior
Mental Health Treatment/hospitalization
Legal or administrative sanctions
Suspension or expulsion
Citation
Arrest
Ban and Bar
Protection Order
Probation or diversion services
Incarceration
Barriers to access the target (physical or social)

n(%)
19(5.7)
130(39.2)
76(22.9)
26(7.8)
16(4.8)
86(25.9)
54(16.3)
55(16.6)
53(16)
46(13.9)
29(8.7)
12(3.6)
9(2.7)
51(15.4)

Last, the majority of the cases required target-focused interventions, which aimed to
protect the targets from the problematic individuals’ actions (n = 208, 62.7%). The most
common target-focused intervention was developing a safety plan with the target (n = 118,
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35.5%). Less often, cases required measures that directly hinder the individuals’ ability to
access the target, including hardening the target with physical security (n = 90, 27.1%),
ensuring other people are with the target at all times (n = 55, 16.6%), and prompting the
target to request a protection order (n = 47, 14.2%).
V. Objective 2: To Assess which Factors Best Predict Physical Approach and Direct
Intervention as Suggested by the Model.
Hypothesis 7: Individuals of concern who engaged in face-to-face problematic
interactions will differ from individuals who do not engage in such behavior. Individuals
who engaged in face-to-face problematic interaction will be more likely to be mentally ill,
to have a prior criminal record, and to display target dispersion.
The seventh hypothesis was partially supported. Contrary to this hypothesis, there
was no relationship between criminal history and problematic approach. However, there
was a positive association between approach and mental illness as well as between
approach and target dispersion, but only in individuals who approached after threat
management interventions were implemented. Table 8 shows individuals, who approached
their targets after the threat assessment and management process started, were more likely
to endorse symptoms of severe mental disorder during the problematic activity, including
hallucinatory disturbances, delusional ideation, and thought disorganization (n = 20, 33.3%
approachers vs. n = 55, 10.4% non-approachers), χ2(1, N = 329) = 4.63, p = .03, φ = .12.
Similarly, these individuals were more likely to share their grievances with third parties
(i.e., target dispersion), (n = 41, 67.2% approachers vs. n = 115, 42.4% non-approachers),
χ2(1, N = 332) = 12.27, p < .001, φ = .19.
Even though it is outside of the scope of this hypothesis, chi-square analyses were
run for the rest of the individuals’ variables (see Table 8 for further reference). The results
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of these analyses showed individuals who approached tended to be motivated by personal
grievances and contacted the target to a larger extent than non-approachers. Similarly,
approachers appeared more likely to be affiliated to the college campus, to display higher
rates of suicidal ideation, and/or to persist contacting the target over the course of the threat
management activity.

Table 8
Differences between approachers and non-approachers at different points of the threat management process

Ethnicity (Caucasian)
Gender (male)
Affiliated to campus
Symptoms of
psychosis
History of suicidality
Current suicidality
History of homicidality
Current homicidality
Alcohol use
Drug use
Criminal history
Prior violence
Personal grievances
Target Dispersion

Age
Total contacts
Total Duration

Pre or Post intervention
No
Approach
pApproach
χ 2*
value
n(%)
n(%)
100(87) 135(90.6)
.88
.35
116(85.9) 159(84.1)
.20
.66
97(70.8) 157(82.6) 6.42
.01
31(22.1)
44(23.3)
.06
.81
21(70)
26(18.3)
14(48.3)
24(16.9)
25(16.8)
22(15.6)
30(24.8)
17(12)
83(58.5)
59(41.5)
M(SD)

39(73.6)
48(25.3)
26(51)
40(21.2)
37(20.3)
42(22.1)
49(29.5)
37(19.6)
132(69.5)
97(51.1)
M(SD)

.12
2.27
.05
.90
.68
2.19
.78
3.44
4.33
2.95
t

30.9(13.9)
9.4(11.3)
6.8(10.3)

34.1(15.2)
12.8(11.4)
6.8(9.1)

-1.95
2.7
-.02

.73
.13
.82
.34
.41
.14
.38
.06
.04
.09
pvalue
.05
.01
.98

Pre-intervention
No
Approach
n(%)
105(86.8)
124(86.7)
104(71.7)
34(23)

Approach

χ 2*

Post-intervention
pvalue

n(%)
130(90.9)
151(83.4)
150(82.4)
41(22.7)

1.15
.67
5.32
.01

.29
.41
.02
.95

23(71.9)
30(20)
16(51.6)
28(18,7)
46(17)
25(16.8)
34(26.6)
18(12)
88(58.7)
64(42.7)
M(SD)

37(72.5)
44(24.2)
24(49)
36(19,8)
16(26.2)
39(21.4)
45(28.3)
36(19.9)
127(69.8)
92(50.5)
M(SD)

.004
.83
.05
.07
2.76
1.14
.11
3.74
4.45
2.05
t

31.2(14.1)
9.6(11.4)
7.1(10.4)

33.6(15)
12.7(11.4)
6.5(9)

-1.50
2.44
-.55

.95
.36
.82
.79
.10
.29
.74
.053
.04
.15
pvalue
.14
.02
.58

No
Approach
n(%)
190(87.6)
223(84.8)
202(75.9)
55(10.4)

Approach

χ 2*

n(%)
45(95.7)
52(85.2)
52(85.2)
20(33.3)

pvalue

2.65
.01
2.48
4.63

.10
.93
.12
.03

44(68.8)
53(19.6)
33(52.4)
54(19,9)
22(15.6)
51(18.9)
63(27.2)
44(16.2)
164(60.5)
115(42.4)
M(SD)

16(84.2)
21(34.4)
7(41.2)
10(16,4)
42(22.1)
13(21.3)
16(29.1)
10(16.7)
51(83.6)
41(67.2)
M(SD)

1.75
6.36
.672
.40
2.19
.19
.08
.01
11.63
12.27
t

32.4(15.3)
10(11)
5.6(9)

32.2(14.4)
17.6(11.4)
12.2(10.6)

.13
4.69
4.92

.19
.01
.41
.53
.14
.67
.77
.94
.001
>.0001
pvalue
.90
>.0001
>.0001

Note: categories are not mutually exclusive as there are some overlap between the pre & post intervention and the other two categories.
* df = 1,
Age: Pre or post reporting + df = 264.6; pre-reporting and post-reporting df = 318
Total contacts: df = 323
Total durations: Pre or post reporting and pre-reporting df = 318; post-reporting df = 78.19
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Hypothesis 8: Individuals who received interventions aiming at restricting their
behavior will differ from individuals who do not receive such interventions. Individuals
who receive interventions aiming at restricting their behavior will more likely be mentally
ill and have past criminal record. These individuals will be also more likely to present
higher rates of face-to-face problematic interactions, direct threats, and higher number
of contacts with the target over time (i.e., at post-intervention phase).
This hypothesis was supported with one exception. Criminal history did not
differentiate between individuals who did and did not receive interventions aiming at
restricting their behavior. However, the rest of the tenets of this hypothesis were all
supported.
Consistent with hypothesis 8, individuals, whose behavior was restricted during the
threat management phase, were more likely to present active symptoms of psychosis (n =
63, 27.8% restrictive vs. n = 12, 11.8% non-restrictive interventions) χ2(1, N = 329) =
10.22, p = .001, φ = .18, and to be more intrusive during their problematic behavior (i.e.,
higher number of contacts M = 2.52, SD = 2.59 restrictive vs. M = 1.09, SD = 1.70 nonrestrictive interventions) t(325) = 5.94, p < .0001, d =.65. In particular, they approached (M
= .64, SD = .48 restrictive vs. M = .43, SD = .50 non-restrictive interventions) t(330) = 3.64,
p < .0001, d = .43, and threatened their targets to a higher extent than individuals who did
not require such restrictive interventions (M = .08, SD = .27 restrictive vs. M = .01, SD =
.10 non-restrictive interventions) t(318.81) = 3.40, p = .001, d = .34.
Table 9 shows the differences between individuals who did and did not receive
interventions aiming at restricting their behavior. Chi-square and t-tests were utilized to
examine the differences between individuals’ factors and problematic behaviors. In order to
ensure the accuracy of the t-tests results, the outliers for all variables were trimmed so the
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assumption of normality was not violated. In addition, the degrees of freedom were
corrected when the Levene’s test suggested the equality of the variances assumption was
violated. None of the chi-square tests needed to be corrected.
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Table 9
Differences between individuals who did and did not receive interventions aiming at
restricting their behavior

Individual factors
Ethnicity (Caucasian)
Gender (male)
Affiliated to campus
Symptoms of psychosis
History of suicidality
Current suicidality
History of homicidality
Current homicidality
Alcohol abuse
Drug abuse
Criminal history
Violent history with target
Personal grievances
Target Dispersion
Age
Post-intervention behaviors
Overall contacts
Overall duration
Written communications
Verbal communications
Public statements
Stalking
Objects left/delivered
Direct Threats
Face-to-face staff
Interception law enforcement
Face-to-face target
Physical assault
Sexual assault
Inappropriate sexual behavior
Interest or use of weapons
Acts of self-harm
Property damage

Restrictive
N = 227
n(%)
169(91.8)
192(84.2)
184(80.7)
63(27.8)
33(52.4)
64(27.9)
51(73.9)
52(22.7)
51(22.4)
54(23.7)
60(29.6)
40(17.5)
161(70.3)
129(56.3)
M(SD)
31.97(14.26)
2.52(2.59)
7.64(9.63)
.84(1.48)
.49(1.30)
.04(.21)
.09(.29)
.03(.16)
.08(.27)
.05(.22)
.08(.27)
.35(.68)
.04(.18)
.01(.12)
.02(.18)
.01(.12)
.07(.27)
.06(.25)

Non-restrictive
χ2 df
N p-value
N = 102
n(%)
66(82.5) 4.98 1 264
.03
83(86.5)
.27 1 324
.61
70(70.7) 3.98 1 327
.05
12(11.8) 10.22 1 329
.001
7(41.2)
.67 1 83
.41
10(9.7) 13.64 1 332 > .0001
9(64.3)
.54 1 80
.46
12(11.7) 5.58 1 332
.02
11(10.7) 6.39 1 331
.01
10(9.7) 8.89 1 331
.003
19(22.6) 1.43 1 287
.23
14(13.6)
.81 1 331
.39
54(52.4) 9.95 1 332
.002
27(26.2) 25.87 1 332 > .0001
M(SD)
t
df p-value
32.82(14.99)
-.47
318
.64
1.09(1.70)
4.34(7.87)
.27(.83)
.19(.79)
0(0)
.02(.14)
.02(.14)
.01(.10)
.06(.24)
.08(.27)
.08(.33)
.01(.10)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
.01(.10)
0(0)

5.94
2.75
4.43
2.58
3.23
3.09
.38
3.40
-.21
.40
4.84
1.63
.931
2.0
.93
2.85
2.23

325 > .0001
224.8
.01
314.32 > .0001
301.73
.01
227
.001
327.94
.002
329
.71
318.81
.001
329
.84
329
.97
326.43 > .0001
320.08
.11
330
.18
228
.05
330
.35
320.1
.01
330
.001
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Table 9 further shows that individuals who received the most restrictive
interventions were more likely to abuse alcohol and drugs as well as to present a higher
number of other concerning behaviors not stipulated in this hypothesis, including
inappropriate sexual advances, self-harm gestures, property damage, stalking activity (e.g.,
surveillance), and unwanted communications. Last, individuals, who needed from
restrictive interventions in order to decrease their risk, seemed more likely to be Caucasian
and to be affiliated to the college campus. While these differences appear statistically
significant, they might not be practically relevant, as both groups of individuals are
predominantly Caucasian males affiliated to the college institution.
VI. Objective 3: To Assess Change in Physical Approach Behavior over Time.
Hypothesis 9: There will be no differences in the subject characteristics, target
factors, or communication themes that predict physical approach before and after a
report was made to law enforcement (i.e., mental illness, criminal history, personal
grievance, and target dispersion).
Hypothesis 9 was supported. There were no differences in the individuals’
characteristics, target factors, or communication themes depending on whether these
individuals approach to their targets before, after, or before and after the threat assessment
case was opened (N = 142). The individuals who did not approach the target were excluded
from this model.
In order to address this hypothesis, a multinomial logistic regression was performed
to model the relationship between the predictors (i.e., mental illness, criminal history,
personal grievance, and target dispersion) and membership in the three mutually exclusive
groups (those approaching the target only at the pre-intervention phase, those approaching
the target only at the post-intervention phase, and those approaching the target at the pre
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and post intervention phases). The traditional .05 criterion of statistical significance was
employed for all tests. The model was overall significant, χ2(8, N = 142) = 17.44,
Nagelkerke R2 = .13, p = .03, but a nuanced look at the comparison tests did not reveal any
significant results, which is in line with this hypothesis. Goodness of fit was explored by
conducting a Pearson test. This test did not yield significant scores, χ2(16) = 15.56, p = .48,
which suggests that the regression results were not likely the product of a poor fitting
model.
As shown in Table 10, non-significant unique contributions were made by mental
illness, criminal history, personal grievance, and target dispersion.
Table 10
Predictors’ unique contribution to the multinomial logistic regression (N = 285)
Predictor
Intersection
Symptoms of psychosis
Criminal record
Personal
Target dispersion

χ2

df

p-value

4.07
2.67
3.65
2.29

2
2
2
2

.30
.34
.13
.20

Next, the three groups were compared against each other, as Table 11 reflects. The
results indicated that no variable appeared to differentiate among the three groups.
However, the target dispersion leaned towards significance in one of the pairwise
comparisons (i.e., approachers at pre and post intervention group vs. approachers at preintervention group). This result suggested that individuals who persisted approaching their
targets at the pre and post management phases displayed a tendency to share their grievance
with third parties to a larger extent than individuals who only approached their targets
before threat assessment professionals intervened.
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Table 11
Parameter estimates contrasting the three groups
B(SE)
Pre & Post intervention vs.
Pre-intervention
Intersection
Personal Communication themes
Symptoms of psychosis
Target Dispersion
Criminal history
Pre & Post intervention vs.
Post-intervention
Intersection
Personal Communication themes
Symptoms of psychosis
Target Dispersion
Criminal history
Pre-intervention vs.
Post-intervention
Intersection
Personal Communication themes
Symptoms of psychosis
Target Dispersion
Criminal history
Note: + p = .065

95% CI for Odds Ratio
Lower
Odds Ratio
Upper

.34(.47)
.80(.49)
.29(.43)
.73(.39)+
-.25(.42)

.84
.58
.96
.34

2.22
1.34
2.07
.78

5.86
3.10
4.48
1.79

-.90(.81)
1.82(1.15)
-1.26(1.03)
.17(.96)
-1.29(.86)

.64
.04
.18
.05

6.14
.28
1.18
.27

58.69
2.15
7.70
1.47

-1.23(.78)
1.02(1.09)
-1.55(1.00)
-.56(.91)
-1.05(.81)

.33
.03
.10
.07

2.76
.21
.57
.35

23.28
1.52
3.42
1.72

Hypothesis 10: It is hypothesized that the number of face-to-face problematic
interactions and direct threats will decrease after initial reporting. However, it is also
hypothesized that subjects who persist in contacting the target(s) will do so post initial
report by engaging in unwanted verbal and written communications.
Hypothesis 10 was partially supported. A superficial, visual inspection of the Figure
5 revealed that virtually all types of problematic interactions with the target tended to fade
over time (no outliers were trimmed in the variables used in the graph). Therefore, not only
did face-to-face interactions and threats decrease over time but also unwanted verbal and
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written communications. Table 12 demonstrated that the differences before and after initial
reporting reached a statistically significant level.
Figure 5
Mean of problematic behaviors against the target over time

18

Written contacts (n = 174)

Verbal contacts (n = 104)

Stalking (n = 74)

Direct Threats (n = 76)

Face-to-face (n = 189)

Physical assault (n = 51)

Sexual assault (n = 8)

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Table 12 shows the results of paired-samples t-tests and differences in the rates of
problematic behaviors before and after the intervention of threat assessment professionals.
As in prior analyses, the outliers and degrees of freedom were addressed when the
assumption of either normality or equality of variances was not met. Consistent with
hypothesis 10, results of the paired-samples t-test show a decrease in the rate of unwanted
physical approach (M = 1.58, SD = 2.01 pre-intervention vs. M = .26, SD = .60 postintervention) t(330) = 12.53, p < .0001, d = .82, as well as threats after law enforcement
intervened in the case (M = .31, SD = .70 pre-intervention vs. M = .06, SD = .23 post-
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intervention) t(330) = 6.73, p < .0001, d = .42. Similarly, the rates of unwanted
communications and stalking activity deceased over time.
Table 12
Descriptive statistics and t-test results for problematic behavior against the target

Written contact
Verbal contact
Stalking
Direct threats
Face-to-face
interactions
Physical assault
Sexual assault

PrePostintervention intervention n
M(SD)
M(SD)
1.86(2.74)
.66(1.34) 331
.86(1.84)
.39(1.17) 330
.30(.66)
.07(.26) 331
.31(.70)
.06(.23) 331
1.58(2.01)
.26(.60) 331
.22(.56)
.02(.14)

.03(.16) 331
.01(.10) 332

95% CI for
Mean
Difference
.91, 1.48
.26, .67
.16, .30
.18, .33
1.12, 1.53
.13, .25
-.003, .03

r

t

.36** 8.30**
.31** 4.55**
.24** 6.52**
.19* 6.73**
.29** 12.53**
.24**
.20**

df
330
329
330
330
330

6.31** 330
1.57 331

Note: * p = .001, ** p < .0001

Despite the significant decrease in physical and sexual violence, there were 11
physical (n = 7) or sexual assaults (n = 4) that occurred even after law enforcement became
involved in the case. Six of these physical assaults were part of domestic abuse situations.
Specifically, the most severe attacks occurred at the off-campus residence, and often
resulted in the target being injured (n = 5). Only a single partner violent episode occurred
on campus, in which the subject of concern prevented his ex-partner from leaving the
college library (e.g., grabbed her by her backpack) (n = 1). No injury resulted from this
interaction. A notable aspect of some of these cases was the targets’ ambivalence to press
charges or request a protection order prior to the assaults, which increased their
vulnerability and hindered law enforcement protection opportunities. The last physical
assault was an attack against a correctional officer in a case in which the individual targeted
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the community in general. Obviously, law enforcement had limited ability to manage this
individual´s aggressiveness while in prison, but this case was still included in the sample.
While the rate of sexual assaults decreased during the management phase of the
threat assessment process, this decrease did not reach statistical significance. This might be
explained by the overall low frequency of this behavior and by the nature of these cases.
Only four sexual assaults occurred during the case management phase. These assaults
consisted of instances of unwanted touching of different females by acquaintances or
strangers off or on campus premises (e.g., person of concern´s car, dorms, or the library).
The persons of concern in these cases often targeted different young women over the course
of their case (i.e., a target was not assaulted twice). Some of these females were initially
ambivalent to report these instances, but they ended up reporting the abuse after other
victims came forward. In these cases, the targets’ perception of safety was paramount for
their cooperation, as some feared retaliation if the abuse was reported. Once law
enforcement had the testimony of the targets, a Title IX process was started and
implemented. In the most extreme cases, charges were pressed. All the problematic
individuals were then effectively managed.
VII. Objective 4: To Test the Applicability of the MFTA Model to College
Educational Settings via Path Analysis.
Re-specification process
Before assessing the applicability of the MFTA model, correlations among all the
variables in the model were conducted (Table 13). Criminal history was excluded from this
model, as it did not significantly correlate with any other variable. Next, mental illness was
not regressed on the variables “pre-intervention physical approach” and “pre-intervention
unwanted communications,” as all the analyses in this dissertation have shown that mental
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illness does not seem to predict pre-intervention problematic face-to-face interactions. Last,
the variable “prior problematic contacts with the target” was not regressed on target
dispersion, as theoretically an increased focus on the target is not necessarily linked to
target dispersion. The rest of the model was not modified.
Pathways in the MFTA model (Figure 6)
The MFTA model is a repeated measure design. In this model, two exogenous
variables, severe mental disorder and prior problematic contact with the target, influenced
the individual’s motivations and the problematic behavior that triggered the opening of a
threat assessment case. Typically, threat management interventions will mediate the
relationship between pre-intervention problematic activity and the post-intervention
problematic activity (e.g., pre-intervention problematic behavior àthreat management
interventionsàpost-intervention problematic behavior). The vast majority of threat
assessment cases required subject-focused interventions (n = 116, 34.9%), target-focused
interventions (n = 95, 28.6%), or a combination of both (n = 113, 34%). Only 8 cases
(2.4%) did not need any intervention beyond default monitoring or information gathering
strategies.
The role of target dispersion as a predictor of repeated problematic physical
approach was more complex. Target dispersion might develop prior to or during the threat
management phase. Therefore, it may or may not be predicted by pre-intervention
problematic behavior, and this was captured in the current model. Similarly, threat
management interventions may or may not include the third parties affected by problematic
activity (i.e., target dispersion). For example, in some cases third parties might be in
different locations, and the protection of these targets was referred to the pertinent local
authorities. On other occasions, third parties might become the grievance receivers during
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the threat management phase, as it was the case of university staff or law enforcement that
intercepted the problematic individual. Although general threat management interventions
also decreased the risk for these secondary targets, there is still the possibility that these
interventions do not mediate the relationship between target dispersion and postintervention problematic activity. Therefore, this possibility was reflected in the model’s
pathways (e.g., target dispersionàthreat management interventionsà post-intervention
problematic behavior, and target dispersionà post-intervention problematic behavior).
Outcome variables
In order to test the effectiveness of threat management interventions decreasing
problematic behavior, two variables that captured the rate of change in problematic
behavior were created. These variables were used as the outcome variables of the structural
equation model (i.e., the two variables located at the right of the Figure 6). As in the initial
theoretical MFTA model, one of these variables reflected the rate of change in physical
approach and physical/sexual assaults against the target (i.e., face-to-face target, physical
assault, sexual assault, and inappropriate sexual behavior). The second variable showed the
rate of change in unwanted communications, threats, stalking, and property damage (i.e.,
written communications, verbal communications, public statements, stalking, objects
left/delivered, direct threats, interest in weapons, and property damage).

Table 13
Correlations among the variables in the model
MI
CH
P
PPC
FTP
CP
TD
SF
TF
FTD
CH
-.10
P
.76**** -.17
PPC
.08
.08
.29****
FTP
-.06
.09
-.01
.49****
CP
.09
-.01
.14**
.35**** .24**
TD
.46**** .03
.57**** .24**** .08
.20****
SF
.34**** .13
.28***
.19*
.11
.28****
.45****
TF
-.05
-.05
.01
.06
.23**** .09
.03
-.70****
FTD
.18*
-.03
.03
-.25**** -.53***
-.14**
.06
-.05
-.04
CD
.25**** -.02
.19*
-.07
-.13*
-.54****
.12
.11
.04
0.24****
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p < .0001
MI = Mental Illness, CH = Criminal History, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic contact with target, FTP =
Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subjectfocused intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted
communication post-intervention.
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Hypothesis 11: The multifactorial model of threat assessment activity will be tested via a
structure equation model. It is expected that the model will yield adequate indices of local
and global fit. It is hypothesized that prior relationship, mental illness, criminal history,
personal grievances, target dispersion, and persistence of problematic behavior over time
will contribute to the structural equation model in a significant manner (e.g., significant
direct effects).
With the exception of criminal history, the tenets of hypothesis 11 were mostly
supported. The model yield overall adequate indices of local and global fit, χ2(17, N= 322)
= 26.1836, p = .061, CFI = .994, TLI = .984, RMSEA = .042. Furthermore, the model
variables significantly contributed to the prediction of problematic behavior. The current
model accounted for 19.7% of the variance of the rate of change in physical approach and
11.9% of the rate of change in unwanted communications.
Direct effects on the MFTA model
The standardized path coefficients are reported in Figure 6, and the unstandardized
coefficients (and SEs) are reported in Table 14. Results of the MFTA model revealed the
unique effects of mental illness and prior problematic contacts on personal communication
themes were significant, which indicate that a longstanding grievance with the target might
become personal over time, especially when symptoms of mental disorder distorted the
individuals’ perception of reality (e.g., the individuals might believe the target is personally
attacking them even if this perception is not grounded in reality).
The unique direct effect of prior problematic contacts on pre-intervention physical
approach and unwanted communications was significant. The direct effect of the personal
communication themes on unwanted communications was also significant. Therefore, those
individuals with a longstanding grievance with the target were more likely to continue to
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physically approach and/or place personal demands on the target, which triggered the
opening of the threat assessment case. In addition, the unique direct effect of personal
communication themes on target dispersion was also significant, which contends that
individuals who felt personally damaged by the targets’ actions were also committed to
sharing their grievance with others.
The unique direct effect of pre-intervention face-to-face approach on target-focused
interventions was significant, which suggested threat management professionals often
protected the target with physical or legal barriers in order to hinder any further problematic
behavior. The unique direct effects of pre-intervention unwanted communications and
target dispersion on subject-focused interventions were also significant. This result suggests
that individuals who relentlessly contacted the target and/or other third parties were more
likely to be negatively sanctioned in order to stop their behavior.
While no variable had significant unique direct effects on the change in the rate of
unwanted communications, it appears target dispersion’s direct effect leaned towards
significance. Similarly, target dispersion’s unique direct effect on the change in the rate of
physical approach was also significant. Therefore, repeated attempts to share the grievance
with third parties should also be seen as a risk factor that contributes to the persistence of
problematic behavior (against the target). Interestingly, both target and subject-focused
interventions uniquely contributed to decrease the rate of physical approach during the
threat management phase, as their unique direct effects were significant but negatively
related.

Figure 6
Direct effects of the Multifactorial model of threat assessment activity (re-specified model)

Standardized estimates (SEs) are reported for each path.
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p < .0001
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Table 14
Unstandardized parameters of direct effects of the MFTA
Direct effects
Estimate S.E. p-value
Personal theme regressed on
Mental Illness
1.81 .39 < .0001
Prior problematic contact
.49 .16
.002
Pre-intervention unwanted communication regressed on
Prior problematic contact
1.95 .57
.001
Personal theme
.57 .26
.025
Pre-intervention face-to-face approach regressed on
Prior problematic contact
1.97 .64
.002
Personal theme
-.25 .31
.42
Target dispersion regressed on
Personal theme
.58 .13 < .0001
Pre-intervention unwanted communication
.02 .03
.363
Pre-intervention face-to-face approach
.03 .03
.350
Target-focused interventions regressed on
Pre-intervention face-to-face approach
.09 .03
.007
Pre-intervention unwanted communication
.003 .02
.865
Target dispersion
.03 .09
.697
Subject-focused interventions regressed on
Pre-intervention face-to-face approach
.01 .04
.860
Pre-intervention unwanted communication
.05 .03
.043
Target dispersion
.48 .12 < .0001
Change in unwanted communications regressed on
Target-focused interventions
-.28 .32
.389
Subject-focused interventions
-.27 .32
.399
Target dispersion
.38 .21
.074
Change in face-to-face approach regressed on
Target-focused interventions
-1.33 .53
.012
Subject-focused interventions
-1.39 .53
.008
Target dispersion
.86 .37
.021
Subject-focused interventions correlated with
Target-focused interventions
-.99 .05 < .0001
Pre-intervention unwanted communication correlated with
Pre-intervention face-to-face approach
3.70 1.47
.012
Change in face-to-face approach
1.45 .83
.077
Pre-intervention face-to-face approach correlated with
Change in face-to-face approach
0.55 .91
.553
Change unwanted communications correlated with
Pre-intervention unwanted communication
-2.58 .63 < .0001
Change in face-to-face approach
-.063 .13
.631
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Hypothesis 12: A decrease in physical approach behavior will be contingent upon
the use of subject-focused management interventions. Statistically, the decrease of
physical approach behavior that occurred after a law enforcement report will be tested
via mediation between pre and post problematic behavior (e.g., 95% CI indirect effects
will not contain zero).
In order to answer hypothesis 12, a bootstrap approach (Shrout & Bolger, 2002),
which maximizes power while minimizing Type I error rate, was implemented.
Bootstrapping provides an empirical approximation of sampling distributions of indirect
effects to produce confidence intervals (CI) of estimates. If zero does not fall within CI, one
can conclude that an indirect effect is different from zero, and therefore, an effect is
present. A nonparametric resampling method (bias-corrected bootstrap) with 1000
resamples was performed in order to derive 95% CIs for indirect effects of mental illness,
prior relationship, personal grievances, pre-interventions problematic behavior, and target
dispersion on change in the rate of physical approach and unwanted communications
through subject-focused and target-focused interventions (see Appendix II for the full
model results).
Specific trajectories of physical approach and role of threat management interventions
Hypothesis 12 was fully supported, as physical approach behavior significantly
reduced over time, and its decrease appeared contingent upon the threat management
interventions. All the variables in the MFTA model have the potential to increase the rate of
problematic behavior over time. Specifically, individuals with symptoms of severe mental
illness and/or a chronically conflictive relationship with the target might contact multiple
third parties in order to make their grievance known and perform several physical
approaches to the target. This trajectory should be considered an escalated trajectory that
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might lead to violence. However, this trajectory was successfully thwarted by threat
management interventions. Similarly, these interventions appeared to effectively decrease
the chance of escalating the pre-intervention unwanted communications and conflictive
face-to-face interactions into further physical approaches or violence. Therefore, it
appeared a decrease in physical approach behavior was truly contingent upon the use of
subject-focused interventions. A summary of the contribution of each variable to the model
is offered below.
Specific indirect effects of all variables in the model
Mental illness
The 95% CI [.17, 1.15] for the indirect effects of mental illness on the rate of
change in physical approach via personal communication themes and target dispersion did
not contain zero. Thus, individuals who experience symptoms of severe mental illness
appeared to approach their targets more over time, especially when they felt personally
aggravated and were committed to voice their grievance to third parties. The opposite
trajectory was found when the indirect effects of mental illness on the rate of change in
physical approach via personal communication themes and target dispersion were further
mediated by subject-focused interventions (95% CI = -1.01, -.13). Thus, individuals with
severe mental illness who contacted third parties placing personal demands appeared to
decrease their rate of approaching the target when restrictions on their behavior were set in
place. Similarly, the 95% CI [-.14, -.01] for the indirect effects of mental illness on the rate
of change in physical approach via personal communication themes, pre-intervention
unwanted communications, and subject-focused interventions did not contain zero. Thus,
individuals with symptoms of mental disorder, who initially contacted their targets placing
personal demands, did not escalate their rate of face-to-face contacts when threat
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assessment professionals implemented different interventions to treat their symptoms
and/or restrict their behavior.
Last, the 95% CI [.05, .41] for the indirect effects of mental illness on the rate of
change in unwanted communications via personal communication themes and target
dispersion did not contain zero. Thus, individuals who suffered from severe mental illness
tended to contact more their targets more over time when they were personally motivated
and felt the need to share their grievances with others in search of support.
Prior problematic contact with the target
Similar to the case of mental illness, the 95% CI [.04, .39] for the indirect effects of
prior problematic relationship with the target on the rate of change in physical approach via
personal communication themes and target dispersion did not contain zero. Thus, a
longstanding conflict between the problematic individuals and the target can lead to an
increase in physical approach when the conflict becomes a personal matter and third parties
are involved. This pathway appears successfully reverted when the indirect effects of
mental illness on the rate of change in physical approach via personal communication
themes and target dispersion were mitigated by subject-focused interventions (95% CI = .33, -.03).
The 95% CI [-.23, -.02] for the indirect effects of prior problematic relationship
with the target on the rate of change in physical approach via pre-intervention unwanted
communications and subject-focused interventions did not contain zero. Similarly, the 95%
CI [-.05, -.002] for the indirect effects of prior problematic relationship with the target on
the rate of change in physical approach via personal communication themes, preintervention unwanted communications, and subject-focused interventions did not contain
zero. Thus, subject-focused interventions appeared to effectively decrease the rate of
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physical approach when individuals with an ongoing conflictive relationship with the target
escalated to problematic communications to express personal and non-personal grievances.
In these situations, threat assessment professionals directly intervened and requested the
problematic individuals to refrain from physically contacting the targets.
A different set of strategies appeared effective when an individual with a
longstanding grievance with the target had problematic face-to-face interactions that could
further escalate into violence. The 95% CI [-.35, -.03] for the indirect effects of prior
problematic relationship with the target on the rate of change in physical approach via prior
physical approach and target-focused interventions did not contain zero. On these
occasions, threat assessment professionals developed physical and legal contingencies that
prevented problematic individuals from re-approaching the target during the threat
management phase. Therefore, target-focused interventions also appeared effective in
decreasing the rate of physical approach.
Last, the 95% CI [.01, .17] for the indirect effects of prior problematic relationship
with the target on the rate of change in unwanted communications via personal
communication themes and target dispersion did not contain zero. Thus, a longstanding
conflict can increase the rate of contacts with the target when the individual feels personally
attacked and need to share their grievance with other parties.
Personal communication themes
The 95% CI [.31, 1.69] for the indirect effects of personal communication themes
on the rate of change in physical approach via target dispersion did not contain zero.
Similarly, the 95% CI [.10, .67] for the indirect effects of personal communication themes
on the rate of change in physical approach via target dispersion did not contain zero Thus,
personal motivations might lead to physically approaching or communicating with the
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target more over time, especially when the problematic individuals feel committed to
sharing their grievance with third parties. It appeared the risk of being personally motivated
to pursue the target for further physical approach was reduced by the use of subject-focused
interventions, as the 95% CI [-1.51, -.22] for the indirect effects of personal communication
themes on the rate of change in physical approach via target dispersion and subject-focused
interventions did not contain zero. In addition,
The use of interventions that restrict the individuals’ behavior also appeared
effective in hindering unwanted personal demands to escalate into physical approach. As
such, the 95% CI [-.23, -.02] for the indirect effects of personal communication themes on
the rate of change in physical approach via pre-intervention unwanted communications and
subject-focused interventions did not contain zero.
Pre-intervention unwanted communications
The 95% CI [-.95, -.11] for the indirect effects of pre-intervention unwanted
communications on the rate of change in physical approach via subject-focused
interventions did not contain zero. Therefore, restricting the problematic individuals’
actions successfully lead to a decrease in the rate of physical approach during the threat
management phase.
Pre-intervention physical approach
The 95% CI [-1.35, -.16] for the indirect effects of pre-intervention physical on the
rate of change in physical approach via subject-focused interventions did not contain zero.
Therefore, restricting the problematic individuals’ actions successfully hinder the
individuals’ likelihood of re-approaching the target during the threat management phase.
Target dispersion
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The 95% CI [-2.60, -.41] for the indirect effects of target dispersion on the rate of
change in physical approach via subject-focused interventions did not contain zero.
Therefore, while contacting several third parties might have the potential to escalate the risk
for physical approach during the threat management phase, the use of interventions that
limit the problematic individuals’ behavior successfully reduced that likelihood.

98
CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSION
Overall, the results of this study suggested the prevention of violence in college campuses
is terribly complex, especially given the open nature of these settings. Institutions of higher
education are interlaced within a larger community and, therefore, vulnerable to a myriad of
threats that are internal and external to the setting. For example, the incidents identified in this
dissertation dealt with individuals suffering individualized stressors (i.e., poor school
performance, conflicted relationships, etc.), subjects acting upon their delusional belief system,
individuals leaking homicidal intent, partner violence, stalking, sexual violence, workplace
violence, and extremist threats/activity. This wide array of concerns often came from an equally
diverse pool of actors, which made the assessment and management of threats challenging. For
this reason, this study was undertaken in order to further inform the protection of institutions of
higher education.
A discussion of the most relevant findings is offered below in hopes of providing a better
understanding of the different factors to consider during the management of threats against
college institutions. Specifically, an analysis of the different factors of the multifactorial model
of threat assessment activity (MFTA) will be offered as well as initial data showing the
effectiveness of the current threat management practices.
Finding 1: There is no profile of problematic individual.
This study’s findings coincided with prior studies underscoring that there is no particular
profile of individuals at risk of engaging in threatening activity or targeted violence (Burns et al.,
2001; Borum et al., 2012; Cornell, 2010; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; Gill, 2015; Horgan, 2008;
Monahan, 2012; O’Toole, 2000). Most of the individuals in this study were Caucasian, males
who ranged extensively in terms of their age (range 18 to 84). There are two implications for this
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finding. First, while this study does not reflect an ethnically diverse sample, it is recommended
culturally sensitive threat management approaches be taken, given the international outreach of
U.S. institutions of higher education. Second, given the disparate ages of individuals of concern,
threat assessment should consider the individuals’ stage of development when analyzing
problematic behavior (e.g., adolescence vs. emergent adulthood vs. adulthood) (see Fein et al.,
2002).
Finding 2: Higher Education threat assessment should not only focus on problem students
(Hypothesis 1).
While no particular profile of problematic individual was found, most of the concerning
behavior was derived from subjects affiliated to the institution (76% approximately). This
finding is in support of this study’s first hypothesis and prior studies (McGuire & Wraith, 2000;
O’Toole, 2000; Reddy et al., 2001). The majority of individuals of concern were problematic
students, and, less often, faculty and university employees.
Nonetheless, this study highlighted that approximately a fourth of the threats emerged
from outsiders, which is consistent with the rates found in a study of college campus attacks
(Drysdale et al., 2010). This result is not surprising given the wide ranging nature and activities
of college institutions, which might attract individuals who are not directly affiliated to the
campus (e.g., athletic events). Therefore, threat assessment professionals should contemplate the
possibility of multiple sources of violence. Next, these professionals might benefit from
establishing strong partnerships with community resources in order to effectively address
outsiders’ activity.
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Finding 3: Individuals at risk do not snap, but deliberately pursue a familiar target.
Consistent with scientific literature and the second part of this study’s first hypothesis
(Calhoun & Weston, 2003; Scalora et al., 2002a), problematic behavior appeared to be the
culmination of long-standing conflicts between individuals who knew each other (i.e., 80% of
the cases in our sample). Threat assessment investigations commenced after problematic
individuals escalated the conflict and started to engage in problematic activity. To wit, they
communicated a threat to harm others or behaved in a manner that demonstrated intent or
capability to engage in violence, as evidenced by physical assaults, angry outbursts, stalking
behavior, or attack preparatory behaviors.
Finding 4: Threat assessment cases in college settings often involved multiple targets.
One of the most relevant findings of this study is that problematic activity was often
directed at multiple people that were and were not preemptively identified by the individuals of
concern. In this study, 199 cases involved multiple targets and 131 cases involved a specifically
named individual.
In cases of multiple primary targets, a particular group of individuals might have been
singled out and harassed for very particular reasons (i.e., increased target focus), which is
consistent with literature (Baumgartner et al., 2001). However, this study also showed that
random strangers had the potential to be targeted as well (i.e., diffuse target), especially when the
person of concern had a grievance against the college institution as a whole. This finding is
particularly relevant because prior studies noticed these diffused targets were also victims of
lethal violence during college campus attacks (even if just accidentally) (see Drysdale et al.,
2010; Vossekuil et al., 2002). Therefore, threat management should be a flexible approach that
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strives to protect not only those targets that are specifically named but also all the other actors
within the institution.
Finding 5: Target dispersion is substantially present (Hypothesis 2).
In addition to the presence of several primary targets, problematic activity often included
multiple secondary targets (i.e., target dispersion). While the second hypothesis of this
dissertation was not supported, target dispersion was still substantially present (47%).
A close analysis of the data suggested target dispersion is a heterogeneous dynamic due
to the different situation in which it emerged (e.g., different type of actors or duration). First,
target dispersion arose when individuals leaked their violent ideation to others, which has also
been described in other studies of school violence (Hoffmann et al., 2011; Reddy et al., 2001).
Second, target dispersion was manifested when university staff or law enforcement actively
prevented problematic individuals from contacting their targets. As a result, these individuals
started contacting the staff or law enforcement to express their frustration (as opposed to
contacting the target). This form of target dispersion has been repeatedly found in the public
officials harassment literature, and it appears its findings are also applicable to college settings
(Baumgartner, 2004; Calhoun, 2001; James et al., 2010a; Marquez & Scalora, 2011; Scalora et
al. 2002a, 2002b; Schoeneman-Morris, Scalora, Chang, Zimmerman, & Garner, 2007). Third,
target dispersion appeared when people close to the target were repeatedly contacted, which has
also been a commonly found behavior in stalking literature (e.g., Spitzberg, 2016). For example,
an individual, who is upset about his team performance, might repeatedly call a college
administrator expressing discontent and requesting his team’s coach be fired.
Regardless of the motivation for target dispersion, an important contention is that these
secondary targets might become primary targets. For example, in this study, law enforcement
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officers became primary targets after they requested the problematic individuals to cease
contacting their targets (7.5% cases). In these situations, the subjects reportedly felt unfairly
treated and personally persecuted by law enforcement. From that point on, they harassed law
enforcement in an attempt to express their sense of injustice (e.g., several voice messages left
daily). Given these results, threat management professionals should carefully analyze target
dispersion patterns and determine which secondary targets might be at risk of becoming primary
targets. One key factor might be the self-reported motivations for threatening activity.
Finding 6: Problematic activity generally stemmed from deeply personal issues (Hypothesis
3).
A notable finding in this study was the identification of a broad range of motives that
were communicated during problematic activity. In support of this study’s third hypothesis and
prior findings on harassment activity studies (Borum, 2015; Scalora et al., 2002a), most of the
motivations for threatening activity were personal in nature (65% of the cases). Specifically, data
suggested individuals of concern had difficulty coping with personal failures, losses (e.g., an
intimate relationship), or individual stressors (i.e., academic, work, or legal issues). These
messages were often communicated in the form of requests for help or emotional statements
indicating the persons of concern felt undermined or unsafe, which was the basis for their
grievances. As indicated by O’Toole (2000), the grievances’ content was often intensified by
embedded emotional states, which were often conveyed during problematic contacts (e.g., anger,
stress, sense of entitlement, fear, or guilt).
In this study, the intense focus upon the presenting grievance appeared related to the
nature, perseverance, and persistence of problematic activity. As observed in other types of
harassment activity (Marquez & Scalora, 2011), this study suggested that the more personal the
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grievance was, the more persistent the person of concern became. In addition, if the underlying
personal motives and emotions were not resolved, motivations like retaliation and intimidation
were likely to appear in the grievances communication themes. In these situations, the targets
were likely to feel unsafe, which triggered their reporting of problematic behavior to law
enforcement.
Finding 7: Problematic activity was rarely reported at first contact (Hypothesis 4).
Typically, targets who felt unsafe contacted law enforcement within 24 hours of the last
incident of problematic activity, but this contact was rarely the onset of problematic activity,
which is consistent with the tenet of the fourth hypothesis of this study.
Overall, the threat assessment process started as a form of primary prevention after the
targets perceived their safety at risk (i.e., preventing victimization from occurring). Given that
targets often oscillate in their perception of risk, their threshold for reporting problematic activity
might vary as well (see Hollister et al., 2014). Accordingly, only a fourth of the cases in this
study were opened within 24 hours of the first incident of problematic activity (28%). Most of
the targets resorted to law enforcement’s help after a long-standing, unresolved conflict with the
problematic individual escalated (57%).
There might be a logical explanation for these findings. If the first incident was perceived
as potentially threatening or violent, the case might have been reported immediately. In other
cases, the first problematic contact might have been innocuous (e.g., an argument). Then, this
incident might have escalated in severity, which led the targets to contact the authorities. When
the targets appraised their situation as dangerous, reporting of problematic behavior occurred
within 24 hours of the last incident.
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An additional explanation was that targets failed to report less severe forms of threat
assessment activity in a timely manner in some of the cases, which is consistent with the
literature (Hollister et al., 2014). For example, a study indicated reporting might have been
particularly delayed in partner violence dynamics. In these cases, law enforcement was contacted
only after physical violence occurred (see Cass & Mallicoat, 2014). In this study, a post-hoc
analysis provided some data in support of this contention. Approximately 67% of the partner
violent cases were opened after a physical assault occurred as opposed to only 11% of the nonpartner violent cases, χ2(1, N = 329) = 79.95, p < .0001, φ = .49. These results suggested that the
threat assessment process might start as part of secondary and tertiary prevention, in which
professionals will intervene to avoid re-victimization of a specific target or will work towards
preventing new targets from being victimized.
Finding 8: Problematic activity in college campuses is particularly intense (Hypothesis 5).
In this study, problematic activity was strongly indicative of intensity of effort, as it
spanned multiple contacts over an extended period of time. Most of the targets were contacted an
average of 11 times via multiple communication channels at on and off campus locations over a
period of six months. In addition, problematic individuals in this study displayed similar
proportions of proximity and non-proximity behaviors (i.e., 54% unwanted written
communications and 57% unwanted physical approach), which was against the predictions of the
fifth hypothesis of this study. In minority of cases (less than 15%), these cases even involved
physical or sexual violence, interest in or use of weapons, as well as self-harming behavior.
Problematic activity in college campuses showed higher levels of intensity of effort than
problematic activity in other samples (e.g., public figures). For example, most of the individuals
who harassed elected officials typically contacted them once and rarely escalated their
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problematic behavior further (57.8%-90%) (see James et al., 2010a; Scalora et al., 2002a).
Similarly, the proportion of physical approach in these studies was well below fifty percent (e.g.,
Hoffman et al., 2011; James et al., 2010a; Scalora et al., 2002a), which heavily contrasted with
the findings of this study.
This study’s results are not surprising given that most of the targets and individuals of
concern knew each other and most of the problematic contacts might have started from close
physical proximity. However, these findings also implied the management of threats might
require a higher proportion of restrictive management strategies than those highlighted in prior
studies (Dietz & Martell, 2010; Hoffman et al., 2011; Scalora et al., 2002a; Scalora et al.,
2002b).
Finding 9: Threat assessment cases required multiple interventions (Hypothesis 6).
Overall, the results of this dissertation showed threat assessment cases were managed
through several interventions over a period of more than a year, which vastly exceeded the
predictions of the sixth hypothesis of this study. Virtually all cases needed different information
gathering strategies (93%) and required restrictive subject-focused, target safety plans, or both
types of direct interventions (98%). These results seem logical in light of the level of intensity of
effort displayed during problematic activity.
Consistent with scientific literature, the threat management process often started
assessing any signs of imminent violence or in reaction to a violent event (Bondü et al., 2011;
Harrell, 2011; Meloy et al., 2011; Meloy et al., 2014; Scalora et al., 2003b). In this study,
approximately 20% of cases were opened for concerns related to current violence or homicidal
ideation, which triggered an immediate response from the threat assessment professionals.
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Immediate responses included legal actions (e.g., arrest), academic sanctions, mandatory mental
health treatment, or a combination of all of them.
When the risk of violence was not deemed imminent, professionals started the threat
management process by assessing and monitoring problematic activity. As explained in the prior
studies (Calhoun & Weston, 2006; Fein et al., 2002), monitoring started after the initial report of
problematic activity. Next, the threat assessment professionals gathered as much information as
possible in order to determine the seriousness of the threat and the veracity of the facts reported
to them (e.g., motivation, intention to approach or attack the target, determine individuals’
mental condition, analyze the consistency between communications and behavior, etc.) (93% of
cases), which is consistent with typical threat assessment practices (see Cornell, 2010; Randazzo
& Plummer, 2009; Reddy et al., 2001). Half of the cases required direct interviews with the
individuals of concern and the targets. Between 30% and 40% of the cases required consulting
and gathering information with college resources such as student affairs or mental health
services. Another 40% of the cases resorted to community liaisons such as other law
enforcement agencies, district attorney’s office, private corporations, or other community actors.
Basically, the focus of the assessment phase was to determine whether the individual had a
genuine intent to harm the target.
If a risk for harming the target was found, the information-gathering strategies were
combined with interventions that required the problematic individuals to cease contact with the
targets. As recommended in the scientific literature (Scalora et al., 2008), these interventions also
aimed at redirecting these individuals to services that would mitigate their grievances. Similarly,
individuals of concern might be required to attend psychological treatment in order to address
different mental health concerns that could be exacerbating their behavior (e.g., hallucinatory
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experiences, delusional ideation, severe agitation, homicidality, suicidality, or substance use)
(26% of cases in our sample) (Cornell & Allen, 2011; Farkas & Tsukayama, 2012; MacKenzie &
James, 2011). If these less intense interventions did not suffice, threat assessment professionals
resorted to interventions that prevented problematic individuals from approaching the targets,
such as severe academic (i.e., 16% of cases ended up in a suspension or expulsion) or legal
sanctions (i.e., 16% involved arrest, 14% ban and barred from campus, 17% citations, etc.).
In accordance with literature (Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage, 2008; Sokolow &
Lewis, 2008), the role of the threat assessment team varied in all these processes. In this study,
the threat assessment team was mostly utilized for consultation purposes. Team members were
rarely appointed to intervene directly in a case unless they were part of the threat management
resources (e.g., team members that work at the student affairs office).
The implementation of threat management strategies was dynamic, flexible, and fluid as
it depended on the behavior of the individuals of concern as well as the targets’ vulnerability.
However, one of the key elements to determine and anticipate an escalation in the level of risk
depended on analyzing different factors that might enhance the individuals’ behavior.
Finding 10: Subject factors enhanced intensity of effort and approach (Hypotheses 7 and
9).
Partially supporting the stipulations of hypothesis 7, the results of this study suggested
that individuals at higher risk for violence presented symptoms of mental illness, endorsed a
personal grievance, displayed behavioral indicators of intensity of effort (e.g., target dispersion),
and physically approached the target. However, the relationship between subject factors and
physical approach was not as initially hypothesized. With the exception of personal grievances,
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the predicted subject factors were not associated with physical approach in general (i.e.,
approach at the pre reporting or/and management phase of the threat assessment process).
In this study, the relationship among physical approach, mental illness, target dispersion,
and intensity of effort appeared in individuals who did not appropriately respond to the threat
management interventions (i.e., approached or re-approached the target though they had been
instructed not to do so by threat assessment professionals). Consistent with hypothesis 9, these
findings cannot be explained by the presence of different groups of individuals who approached
the target at different points in time (i.e. pre-intervention, post-intervention, as well as pre or
post-intervention). Rather, it appears that factors such as mental illness, personal grievances, and
target dispersion combined in order to increase the risk for physically re-approaching the target
in individuals who did not respond to initial management interventions.
Thus, compared to individuals who did not continue to approach after law enforcement
intervened in the case, re-approachers were more likely to be individuals with symptoms of
mental illness, who viewed their grievance as extremely distressing and central to their life.
Some of these individuals might be desperate and even contemplating suicide as the only
solution to their problems. As a result, these individuals often spent increasing amounts of time
and resources communicating their grievance and level of distress to the target and other third
parties despite any attempts from professionals to ameliorate their concerns (see tables 7 and 12).
These findings continued to support prior studies underscoring the need to appropriately address
symptoms of severe mental disorder and implement vigilant case management strategies that
would capture the fluid nature of the risk posed by individuals with severe mental disorder who
hold a personal grievance against the target (see Scalora et al., 2002a; Scalora & Marquez, 2011;
Schoeneman, et al., 2007; Schoeneman et al., 2011).
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Finding 11: Threat management is a fluid process (Hypothesis 8).
Consistent with the MFTA model (Scalora & Bulling, 2007; Scalora, Zimmerman, &
Wells, 2008; Scalora, Plank, & Scheoneman, 2009) and hypothesis 8, there is no single protocol
of threat management that can cover all cases. This is mostly due to the fluid nature and
evolution of threats over time. When a threat cannot just be resolved with simple conflict
resolution tactics, threat assessment professionals might need to implement strategies that would
impose some form of restrictions on the individuals’ behavior (see Cornell, 2010).
In this study, individuals who showed the most intense behavioral dynamics and/or
presented different enhancers of problematic activity often necessitated direct interventions in
order to de-escalate their risk. The level of concern raised by these individuals ranged from
causing disruption (e.g., unwanted verbal and written communications) to intimidation (e.g.,
direct threats) to impending violence (e.g., face-to-face approaches, inappropriate sexual
behavior, or property destruction). These subjects could also display active symptoms of
psychosis, current homicidality or suicidality, and severe substance intoxication during their
problematic activity. Therefore, these subjects were the focus of the most restrictive
interventions given their potential to endanger the targets.
Interestingly, the subjects’ criminal history did not appear to have any bearing with
respect to their likelihood to approach or be the focus of the most restrictive interventions. This
result contrasted with the tenets of hypotheses 7 and 8 as well as past studies (Fein & Vossekuil,
1999; Scalora et al., 2002a). A potential explanation might be that some subjects in this sample
were not of, or barely above, the age of majority or might have limited time to acquire adult
criminal convictions (ages 18 or 19, 15% of the subjects). A second explanation is that
problematic individuals in community and college student samples might be less likely to have
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prior criminal records on average than other samples of problematic individuals (e.g., sample of
public figures harassers, Scalora et al., 2002a).
Finding 12: Threat management interventions effectively decreased problematic behavior
over time (Hypotheses 10, 11, and 12).
The results of this study showed a significant decrease in the rate of violence, physical
approach, threats, surveillance, and unwanted communications over time, which is consistent
with hypothesis 10 of this study. This decrease is believed to be the result of the effective
implementation of management strategies that had the potential for long-term prevention of
violence. Consistent with hypothesis 11, the MFTA model permitted to statistically corroborate
this assumption.
As demonstrated throughout this study, the assessment and management of threats are
interdependent processes. When an individual was deemed as posing a threat towards the college
institution, a specific management/monitoring plan was developed. A nuanced analysis of the
MFTA model supported the presence of different factors that exacerbated intensity of effort and
led to an escalation of problematic activity if no appropriate course of action was taken.
Therefore, the first step of this model was to identify when subjects posed a threat towards the
targets and how problematic activity could escalate over time.
One of the factors that escalated the risk for continuing to physically approach the target
was the presence of long-term problematic behavior in the context of a longstanding personal
grievance (e.g., personal losses). These grievances appeared to become deeply embedded in the
interpersonal conflict and even extended to other parties. These unresolved grievances tended to
perpetuate and escalate into problematic activity, which has also been observed in other samples
(Baumgartner, 2004; Scalora et al., 2003; Schoeneman et al., 2011). In this study, one example
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of this dynamic was the type of conflicts that arose after the termination of an intimate
relationship. In these situations, problematic behavior had already occurred before the
dissolution of the relationship (e.g., multiple calls, surveillance, etc.). However, the individuals’
behavior worsened when the couple finally broke up (e.g., intimidation, threats, or emotional
blackmail may be used to renew the relationship). If no effective interventions were
implemented, these cases had the potential to escalate into approach and violence over time.
Similarly, acute symptoms of severe mental disorder appeared to be foundational for
escalating the risk for repeated communications, physical approach, and targeted violence, which
continues to endorse the robustness of this risk factor for predicting targeted violence
(Baumgartner et al., 2001; Dietz & Martell, 2010; Marquez & Scalora, 2011; Meloy et al., 2012;
Scalora et al, 2002a; Scalora et al., 2003). Individuals who experienced delusions or
hallucinations displayed rigid beliefs that often led to very personal and inaccurate perceptions of
their reality (i.e., personal grievances that were delusional in nature). These beliefs often served
as a justification for their actions and translated in intense patterns of communications destined
to publicize their cause against the target and other third parties. These individuals often felt
entitled to their actions and could not understand other people questioning their justifications.
Therefore, they were more likely to persist in their behavior until others are convinced of their
rightfulness. In this study, the typical example would be those individuals who, after a period of
bizarre communications, approached the college campus aiming at voicing their grudges, which
could be persecutory or conspiracy-based. In the most extreme cases, this approached might have
involved weapons and a desire to carry an attack. In this particular situation, an extreme
intervention was needed in order to decrease risk.
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Regardless of the presence of a mental disorder or the number of prior problematic
episodes, target dispersion often mediated the path between the subject factors and physical
approach during the threat management phase (i.e., prior problematic relationship, mental illness,
and personal communication themes). The relationship between physical approach and target
dispersion was not straightforward. However, this behavioral activity should still be considered a
risk factor for physical approach and violence in light of this dissertation and other studies’
results (Marquez & Scalora, 2011). In this study, target dispersion often involved repeatedly
contacting parties that were very proximate to the target. Therefore, approaching these parties,
and subsequently the target, was the next logical step in these individuals’ pathway towards
violence. For example, if a student wanted to pressure the Dean of Students in order to get
academic probation revoked, this student might have repeatedly harassed the Dean’s assistant at
the student affairs office before successfully accessing the Dean. Other scenarios of this study
suggested target dispersion occurred as a result of wanting to gain power and control over the
targets’ environment. For example, an individual might have repeatedly debased his/her expartner on social media and might have extensively damaged the target’s public reputation (e.g.,
texted all the target’s friends), which may be cathartic by itself for this aggrieved individual.
However, in this situation the individual of concern may also be able to socially isolate the
target, making this person more vulnerable to being approached while alone. In this study, target
dispersion also evolved into physical approach when this activity involved leaking an already
formed plan of approaching and harming a specific target. For example, a student might leak to
his neighbor and friend his ideas of attacking his classmates, who are perceived as bullies and
responsible for his academic failure. In all these dynamics, direct interventions were needed in
order to successfully de-escalate the risk.
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Consistent with hypothesis 12, the results of this study suggested all the trajectories
with the potential to escalate towards approach or violence became thwarted after the use
of intervention strategies that contained the situation and protected the targets. In addition,
the results of this study allowed ensuring these strategies prevented violence at a long-term,
as the threat assessment cases were monitored for a substantial amount of time after
problematic activity ceased.
A nuanced analysis of this study’s data found that virtually all cases resolved with no
physical violence occurring on the college campus. Only one target was re-victimized on campus
premises, and this event involved minor physical contact (i.e., grabbing the target’s backpack
without causing any injury).
The MFTA model suggested that threat management interventions often placed strong
emphasis on grievance resolution, which is consistent with effective management practices
highlighted in prior studies (see Cornell et al., 2009). In this study, individuals with long-term
conflicts with the target, who had engaged in problematic communications and approaches in the
past, were at risk of continuing to approach the target. In these situations, problematic
individuals often received help so the intensity of the conflict would deescalate and they would
abandon their course of action. These interventions were effective on the majority of occasions.
Thus, only a minority of the cases necessitated long-term suspension, banning the individual
from the college properties, or legal interventions. In cases where the individuals of concern
were not affiliated to the college campus, appropriate referrals to community services were made
so limited use of the legal and the criminal system was needed.
When the containment of potential attackers was required (e.g., arrest, involuntary
hospitalization, or legal barriers to approaching the target), additional interventions were utilized
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to supervise and effectively prevent any further problematic contact. For example, in this study,
individuals of concern with symptoms of severe mental illness who engaged in unwanted
communications against the target and/or other third parties had the potential to escalate into
physical approach and violence. However, the results of the MFTA model suggested that these
individuals were successfully deterred by interventions that restricted their behavior and
interventions that addressed their symptoms (i.e., mental health treatment). The key element was
that the mental health referral was also made within the context of an overall management plan.
Consistent with the recommendations made by the United States Secret Service, the FBI, and the
United States Department of Education (see Amman et al., 2016; Fein et al., 2002), the threat
assessment team could monitor these individuals’ progress in treatment and ensure that no
violence was likely to occur.
Another characteristic of the interventions that focused on restricting the individuals’
behavior was the ability to combine different short and long-term strategies. While initial
containment of the threatening situation was paramount for a short-term intervention, the longterm interventions often focused on decreasing the intensity of the individuals’ grievances. In
this study, these long-term interventions were crucial when individuals were motivated by
personal demands. In these cases, individuals of concern had the potential to approach and
continue re-approaching the target in a threatening manner when their grievances were central to
their identity and life goals. These individuals often needed long-term interventions that required
several interviews that were non-confrontational in nature and preserved these individuals’
dignity (see Calhoun & Weston, 2015). In these interviews, the individual had the opportunity to
express their personal stressors and losses. At the same time, these interviews sent the message
that these individuals’ behavior has been noticed and could be negatively sanctioned by
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authorities (see Fein et al., 2002). Within this frame, these regular contacts were the perfect
avenue to re-direct these individuals’ behavior and continue assessing their level of threat.
Last, target-focused interventions were crucial in situations where individuals have
engaged in repeated physical approach and had the potential to repeat the behavior and attack the
target. In this study, subject-focused interventions were integrated in a larger safety plan for the
target and appeared consistent with evidenced-based safety strategies (see Meloy, 1998; Miller,
2012; Storey & Hart, 2011). In these plans, the target was trained to preserve evidence that could
be used to press charges later (e.g., texts, emails, etc.). Next, they were recommended to enlist
the assistance of their social network so they cannot be ambushed alone in a remote area. In the
most extreme cases, law enforcement officers were appointed in order to protect the target in
environments where the individual of concern had verbalized a desire to approach the target.
Even after problematic activity ceased, formal monitoring continued for an extended
period of time (e.g., typically some months). After a determination was made that the subject no
longer posed a threat to the institution, the formal monitoring terminated and the case was
deemed inactive. However, no case was fully closed, as cases might become active again at a
future time. Therefore, it is recommended that threat assessment professionals document the
active cases and preserve the information collected for future reference.
Limitations and Implications of the Study
This study is among the first to test a conceptual model of threat assessment activity via a
structural equation model. However, it presents several limitations that warrant further
discussion. First, while mediation models are typically acceptable for assessing pre and post
behavioral differences after an intervention (e.g., collection of two data points in time), the gold
standard of assessing change over time is collecting several data points (Finch & Shim, 2018).
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Similarly, the outcome variable for the mediation model was computed from “raw change” in
behavior. While this approach is statistically acceptable (Kenny, 2013), other options involving
growth modeling might be preferable (see Finch & Shim, 2018). The second limitation of this
study is the inability to fully assess statistically whether problematic activity would have
escalated to violence if no interventions were implemented. While there are reasonable and
sound data suggesting violence was a very plausible outcome for several cases, this was not
formally tested given the retrospective nature of the study (e.g., data collection was performed
for cases that had been already cleared). The third limitation is the lack of information about
interaction effects in the mediation model. All the trajectories include variables that uniquely
lead to physical approach. The mediation model is not able to provide specific information about
the overlap of these characteristics. Future studies might focus on a particularly small area of this
model and analyze the variables via multilevel modeling. Fourth, cohort effects might have
affected how the cases evolved over a period of ten years and this influence was very difficult to
determine. Fifth, the immense diversity of cases proved difficult to capture in a parsimonious
manner. Therefore, a conservative approach was taken when selecting the most relevant
behavioral information that would fully inform about the nature of risk for targeted violence.
This might have precluded low occurrence cases, such as the ones related to radicalization and
terrorism, to get fully portrayed in this study data. Lastly, the data for this study relies on
observations from law enforcement investigators. Such reports might vary in terms of
thoroughness or level of detail. Therefore, the authors decided to take a conservative approach
and coded strictly behavioral indicators that were reliably assessed by the coders. Even with this
precaution, five variables in this study displayed poor interrater agreement.
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Despite these limitations, the current study contends threat assessment is a successful
preventive approach for institutions of higher education that covers a wide array of dynamics,
individuals, and situations. Specifically, this study offered a better understanding of the patterns
of behavioral escalation, risk enhancers for targeted violence, and deterrence for violence via a
multifactorial model of threat assessment activity. Overall, this study supported the use of this
model in evaluating the effectiveness of current threat management strategies when aiming to
decrease problematic activity and prevent violence. The main finding was that subject-focused
interventions in combination with sound target safety plans were effective in significantly
decreasing problematic activity. The current study is a first approach to assist practitioners in
identifying specific factors that can modify a risk formulation in college settings so these
institutions can be better protected.
Future studies might replicate this study in order samples and settings in order to further
assess the validity of the MFTA model. First, more studies need to investigate how targeted
violence unfolds over time. Specifically, these studies could explore the different patterns of
behavioral escalation. Some behavioral trajectories might escalate faster, and better
understanding of the risk factors that enhance risk might assist threat assessment professionals in
preventing violence more effectively. Second, further analysis of the threat management
interventions is needed in order to continue to examine the effectiveness of such interventions.
For example, cluster analysis might assist in determining the different combination of
interventions over time. Last, additional research focusing on target protection is recommended
in order to better understand targets’ cooperation (or lack thereof).
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APPENDIX I
Interrater reliability scores
Variable
Individuals’ characteristics
Relationship between POC and target
Affiliation to campus
Alias
Prior violent history with target
Prior criminal history
Symptoms of major mental illness
Alcohol abuse
Drug abuse
History of suicidality
History of homicidality
Target factors
Affiliation of the target to the university
Target dispersion
Type grievance receivers (average K)
Lapse of time
Number of targets
Expressed concern for their safety
Communication themes
Personal grievances
Target-focused grievances
Social issues grievances
Contact locations
Contacts within college campus
Contacts outside the college campus
Problematic behavior
Unwanted written communications
Unwanted verbal communications
Threats
Public statements
Object delivered
Face-to-face contact with targets
Face-to-face contact with non-targets
Assaults
Leakage of violent ideation
Violent ideation
Current suicidal ideation (leakage)
Current homicidal ideation (leakage)
Access to weapons (leakage)

ICC/K
ICC
.96
K
.94
N/A
.88
.71
.82
1.00
.56
.40
.42
K
.69
.77
.57
ICC
.77
N/A
.69
K
.79
.54
.76
K
.87
.60
ICC
.80
.99
.68
N/A
N/A
.91
.73
.88
K
.91
.70
.72
.81
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Interventions
ICC
Monitoring
.84
Information gathering
Threat assessment meeting
.90
Interview subject/welfare check
.62
Coordination student affairs
.88
Mental health consultation
.81
Consult law enforcement
.73
Target-Focused interventions
.78
Restrictive interventions
Interview subject/welfare check
.77
Intervention student affairs
.74
Mental health interventions
.92
Law enforcement interventions
.76
Arrest
.66
Citation
.83
Note: N/A = no IRR value due to this variable not being present during interrater sample or
being a recode from existing variables.
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APPENDIX II
Indirect effects of the multifactorial model of threat assessment activity
Effects of mental illness to Change in
face-to-face approach

95% Confidence Interval
Lower bound
(2.5%)

Estimate

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.158
0.158

Total
-0.017
0.060
Total indirect
-0.017
0.060
Specific Indirect
MIàPàTDàFTD
0.174
0.424
1.154
MIàPàTDàFTD
-0.048
-0.005
0.003
MIàPàCPàTDàFTD
-0.001
0.009
0.091
MIàPàFTPàSFàFTD
-0.011
0.002
0.051
MIàPàCPàSFàFTD
-0.140
-0.034
-0.008
MIàPàTDàSFàFTD
-1.008
-0.333
-0.131
MIàPàFTPàTFàFTD
-0.011
0.025
0.171
MIàPàCPàTFàFTD
-0.030
-0.002
0.027
MIàPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.236
-0.022
0.067
MIàPàFTPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.003
0.004
0.036
MIàPàCPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.084
-0.007
0.005
MIàPàFTPàTDàTFàFTD
0.000
0.000
0.015
MIàPàCPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.020
0.000
0.002
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.

146
Effects of prior problematic contacts to Change in
face-to-face approach

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Estimate
bound
(2.5%)
-0.300
-0.195
-0.300
-0.195

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
-0.059
-0.059

Total
Total indirect
Specific indirect
RELàPàTDàFTD
0.041
0.137
0.390
RELàFTPàTDàFTD
-0.009
0.024
0.120
RELàCPàTDàFTD
-0.008
0.021
0.117
RELàFTPàSFàFTD
-0.138
-0.012
0.073
RELàCPàSFàFTD
-0.229
-0.075
-0.020
RELàFTPàTFàFTD
-0.354
-0.130
-0.030
RELàCPàTFàFTD
-0.070
-0.005
0.052
RELàPàFTPàTDàFTD
-0.019
-0.002
0.001
RELàPàCPàTDàFTD
0.000
0.003
0.030
RELàPàFTPàSFàFTD
-0.003
0.001
0.017
RELàPàCPàSFàFTD
-0.053
-0.011
-0.002
RELàPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.333
-0.107
-0.030
RELàFTPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.104
-0.019
0.008
RELàCPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.109
-0.016
0.007
RELàPàFTPàTFàFTD
-0.003
0.008
0.057
RELàPàCPàTFàFTD
-0.012
-0.001
0.008
RELàPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.093
-0.007
0.018
RELàFTPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.035
-0.001
0.003
RELàCPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.026
-0.001
0.002
RELàPàFTPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.001
0.001
0.016
RELàPàCPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.029
-0.002
0.000
RELàPàFTPàTDàTFàFTD
0.000
0.000
0.004
RELàPàCPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.009
0.000
0.000
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Personal theme to Change in face-toface approach

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Estimate
bound
(2.5%)
-0.032
0.102
-0.032
0.102

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.251
0.251

Total
Total indirect
Specific indirect
PàTDàFTD
0.313
0.722
1.690
PàFTPàTDàFTD
-0.091
-0.008
0.006
PàCPàTDàFTD
-0.002
0.016
0.146
PàFTPàSFàFTD
-0.019
0.004
0.087
PàCPàSFàFTD
-0.227
-0.058
-0.015
PàTDàSFàFTD
-1.509
-0.568
-0.221
PàFTPàTFàFTD
-0.019
0.043
0.254
PàCPàTFàFTD
-0.053
-0.004
0.043
PàTDàTFàFTD
-0.411
-0.038
0.112
PàFTPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.005
0.006
0.069
PàCPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.151
-0.013
0.001
PàFTPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.001
0.000
0.018
PàCPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.053
-0.001
0.001
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Pre-intervention unwanted
communications
to Change in face-to-face approach

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Estimate
bound
(2.5%)
-0.965
-0.381
-0.965
-0.381

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
-0.041
-0.041

Total
Total indirect
Specific indirect
CPàTD->FTD
-0.044
0.103
0.548
CPàSFàFTD
-0.947
-0.373
-0.106
CPàTFàFTD
-0.311
-0.025
0.295
CPàSFàFTD
-0.515
-0.081
0.030
CPàTFàFTD
-0.144
-0.005
0.011
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Pre-intervention face-to-face
approach
to Change in face-to-face approach

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
bound
(2.5%)
-1.160
-1.160

Estimate

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
-0.077
-0.077

Total
-0.586
Total indirect
-0.586
Specific indirect
FTPàTDàFTD
-0.043
0.104
0.422
FTPàSFàFTD
-0.498
-0.051
0.269
FTPàTFàFTD
-1.353
-0.551
-0.162
FTPàTDàSFàFTD
-0.371
-0.081
0.029
FTPàTDàTFàFTD
-0.120
-0.005
0.015
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Target Dispersion to Change in faceto-face approach

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Estimate
bound
(2.5%)
0.059
0.199
-3.025
-1.036

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.355
-0.418

Total
Total indirect
Specific indirect
TDàSFàFTD
-2.602
-0.971
-0.411
TDàTFàFTD
-0.693
-0.065
0.190
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention
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Effects from Mental illness to Change in unwanted
communications

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Estimate
bound
(2.5%)
0.037
0.093
0.037
0.093

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.172
0.172

Total
Total indirect
Specific indirect
MIàPàTDàCD
0.050
0.149
0.414
MIàPàFTPàTDàCD
-0.022
-0.002
0.002
MIàPàCPàTDàCD
-0.001
0.003
0.023
MIàPàFTPàSFàCD
-0.002
0.000
0.011
MIàPàCPàSFàCD
-0.032
-0.005
0.000
MIàPàTDàSFàCD
-0.273
-0.052
0.008
MIàPàFTPàTFàCD
-0.002
0.004
0.037
MIàPàCPàTFàCD
-0.010
0.000
0.004
MIàPàTDàTFàCD
-0.078
-0.004
0.013
MIàPàFTPàTDàSFàCD
0.000
0.001
0.013
MIàPàCPàTDàSFàCD
-0.024
-0.001
0.000
MIàPàFPTàTDàTFàCD
0.000
0.000
0.004
MIàPàCPàTDàTFàCD
-0.003
0.000
0.000
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Prior contact with target
to Change in unwanted communications

95% Confidence Interval
Lower bound
(2.5%)

Estimate

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.054
0.054

Total
-0.060
0.004
Total indirect
-0.060
0.004
Specific indirect
RELàPàTDàCD
0.013
0.048
0.166
RELàFTPàTDàCD
-0.007
0.009
0.049
RELàCPàTDàCD
-0.004
0.007
0.061
RELàFTPàSFàCD
-0.029
-0.002
0.021
RELàCPàSFàCD
-0.126
-0.012
0.001
RELàFTPàTFàCD
-0.093
-0.022
0.000
RELàCPàTFàCD
-0.048
-0.001
0.010
RELàPàFTPàTDàCD
-0.009
-0.001
0.000
RELàPàCPàTDàCD
0.000
0.001
0.010
RELàPàFTPàSFàCD
-0.001
0.000
0.004
RELàPàCPàSFàCD
-0.013
-0.002
0.000
RELàPàTDàSFàCD
-0.138
-0.017
0.000
RELàFTPàTDàSFàCD
-0.036
-0.003
0.001
RELàCDàTDàSFàCD
-0.077
-0.003
0.001
RELàPàFTPàTFàCD
-0.001
0.001
0.014
RELàPàCPàTFàCD
-0.004
0.000
0.001
RELàPàTDàTFàCD
-0.033
-0.001
0.004
RELàFTPàTDàTFàCD
-0.020
0.000
0.001
RELàCPàTDàTFàCD
-0.020
0.000
0.000
RELàPàFTPàTDàSFàCD
0.000
0.000
0.006
RELàPàCPàTDàSFàCD
-0.008
0.000
0.000
RELàPàFTPàTDàTFàCD
0.000
0.000
0.002
RELàPàCPàTDàTFàCD
-0.001
0.000
0.000
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Personal theme to Change in unwanted
communications

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Estimate
bound
(2.5%)
0.070
0.159
0.070
0.159

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.269
0.269

Total
Total indirect
Specific indirect
PàTDàCD
0.098
0.254
0.673
PàFTPàTDàCD
-0.038
-0.003
0.003
PàCPàTDàCD
-0.001
0.006
0.040
PàFTPàSFàCD
-0.004
0.001
0.018
PàCPàSFàCD
-0.057
-0.009
-0.001
PàTDàSFàCD
-0.445
-0.088
0.012
PàFTPàTFàCD
-0.004
0.007
0.064
PàCPàTFàCD
-0.016
-0.001
0.007
PàTDàTFàCD
-0.129
-0.006
0.021
PàFTPàTDàSFàCD
-0.001
0.001
0.026
PàCPàTDàSFàCD
-0.044
-0.002
0.000
PàFTPàTDàTFàCD
0.000
0.000
0.007
PàCPàTDàTFàCD
-0.006
0.000
0.000
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Pre-intervention of unwanted
communications
to Change in unwanted communications

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
bound
(2.5%)
-0.383
-0.383

Estimate

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.063
0.063

Total
-0.040
Total indirect
-0.040
Specific indirect
CPàTDàCD
-0.021
0.036
0.201
CPàSFàCD
-0.415
-0.058
0.003
CPàTFàCD
-0.143
-0.004
0.049
CPàTDàSFàCD
-0.247
-0.013
0.005
CPàTDàTFàCD
-0.067
-0.001
0.002
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Pre-intervention face-to-face
approach to Change in unwanted
communications

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
bound
(2.5%)
-0.186
-0.186

Estimate

Upper
bound
(97.5%)
0.023
0.023

Total
-0.077
Total indirect
-0.077
Specific indirect
FTPàTDàCD
-0.023
0.036
0.214
FTPàSFàCD
-0.100
-0.008
0.095
FTPàTFàCD
-0.316
-0.092
0.004
FTPàTDàSFàCD
-0.153
-0.013
0.006
FTPàTDàTFàCD
-0.066
-0.001
0.003
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.
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Effects from Target Dispersion
to Change in unwanted communications

95% Confidence Interval
Lower bound
(2.5%)
0.141
-0.936

Estimate

Upper bound
(97.5%)
0.404
0.013

Total
0.273
Total indirect
-0.162
Specific indirect
TDàSFàCD
-0.771
-0.151
0.019
TDàTFàCD
-0.202
-0.011
0.036
NOTE: MI = Mental Illness, P = Personal communication theme, PPC = Prior problematic
contact with target, FTP = Face-to-face target/assault pre-intervention, CP = Unwanted
communication pre-intervention, TD = Target dispersion, SF = Subject-focused
intervention, TF = Target-focused intervention, FTD = Change in face-to-face
target/assault, CD = Change in unwanted communication post-intervention.

